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CHARGING ON THE MARGIN 
PAUL T. CRANE* 
ABSTRACT 
The American criminal justice system has experienced a signifi-
cant expansion in the number and severity of penalties triggered by 
misdemeanor convictions. In particular, legislatures have increas-
ingly attached severe collateral consequences to misdemeanor of-
fenses-penalties such as requirements to register as a sex offender, 
prohibitions on owning or possessing a firearm, and deportation. 
Although there is a wealth of scholarship studying the effect this 
development has on defendants and their attorneys, little attention 
has been paid to the impact collateral consequences have on prosecu-
torial incentives. This Article starts to remedy that gap by exploring 
the influence that collateral consequences exert on initial charging 
decisions in low-level prosecutions. 
Critically, the ability to impose certain collateral consequences 
through a misdemeanor conviction unlocks an array of additional 
charging options for prosecutors. As a result, prosecutors are now 
more likely to engage in a practice I term "strategic undercharging." 
A prosecutor engages in strategic undercharging when she charges 
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a lesser offense than she otherwise could, but does so for reasons that 
advance her own prosecutorial aims--and not as an act of grace or 
leniency. In other words, prosecutors can sometimes gain more by 
charging less. By explaining why (and when) prosecutors are likely 
to engage in strategic undercharging, this Article complicates the 
conventional wisdom that prosecutors reflexively file the most severe 
charges available. 
This Article also proposes that collateral consequences be factored 
into the determination of what procedural safeguards are afforded 
a criminal defendant. Under existing law, collateral consequences 
are generally deemed irrelevant to that inquiry; the degree of proce-
dural protection provided in a given case turns exclusively on the 
threatened term of incarceration. Changing this approach could have 
several salutary effects on the administration of collateral conse-
quences. At a minimum, it would honor a basic principle underlying 
our criminal justice system: the threat of serious penalties warrants 
serious procedures. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Misdemeanor or felony? That is a question prosecutors routinely 
ask themselves when deciding what charges to file in a given case. 
And the answer is important, for misdemeanor prosecutions and 
felony prosecutions differ in significant ways. Among other things, 
felonies threaten more severe penalties than misdemeanors, but 
they also trigger more procedural safeguards. 
Accordingly, when a prosecutor is deciding whether to bring a 
felony or misdemeanor charge, she generally must determine 
whether the ability to impose heightened penalties is worth the 
costs generated by the more demanding procedures. Sometimes the 
answer is obvious-homicide will be charged as a felony, jay-
walking as a misdemeanor. But often the answer is not so clear. For 
many cases, the alleged conduct could plausibly be charged either 
as a felony or as a misdemeanor. In those circumstances, prosecu-
tors must decide whether the ability to impose felony penalties is 
worth enduring felony procedures. 
That, at least, is the choice prosecutors traditionally faced when 
charging on the margin. Over the last two decades, however, the 
American criminal justice system has experienced a significant 
expansion in the number and severity of penalties triggered by 
misdemeanor convictions. 1 Specifically, legislatures have increas-
ingly attached severe collateral consequences to misdemeanor 
offenses-consequences that formerly were triggered only by felo-
nies. 2 For example, misdemeanor convictions can now lead to a 
defendant being required to register as a sex offender, prohibited 
from owning or possessing a firearm, or deported.3 
This Article's primary claim is that attaching those sorts of col-
lateral consequences to misdemeanor offenses provides prosecutors 
with strong incentives to charge a borderline case as a misdemeanor 
1. See infra note 43 and accompanying text. 
2. Collateral consequences are sanctions that fall outside the sentencing authority of the 
trial court. Some prominent examples include disenfranchisement, sex offender registration, 
and firearm prohibitions. They are distinct from a conviction's so-called direct consequences, 
which include incarceration, fines, and terms of probation. For more on the difference between 
collateral and direct consequences, see infra Part I.A. 
3. See infra notes 57-59 and accompanying text. 
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rather than a felony. This claim rests principally on two widely 
accepted facts. 
First, in many criminal cases, the most significant penalty at 
stake is a collateral consequence rather than incarceration.4 This is 
especially true for cases involving relatively low-level prosecutions, 
which I consider for the purposes of this Article to be prosecutions 
for either a low-grade felony or a misdemeanor. In those cases, a 
collateral consequence will often be a prosecutor's most potent and 
enduring sanction. 
Collateral consequences can frequently be used to further a 
prosecutor's sentencing aims, including the standard goal of re-
ducing threats to public safety. 5 Such consequences take on even 
more significance in low-level prosecutions given their relative 
duration. Although incarceration terms for low-level convictions 
typically top out at a couple of months-and rarely more than a few 
years-several key collateral consequences last for decades or even 
life.6 For example, the obligation to register as a sex offender lasts 
for a minimum of fifteen years and sometimes for life. 7 Firearm 
prohibitions are typically lifetime bans.8 And deportation results 
in permanent exclusion from the United States.9 In short, as the 
drafters of the Uniform Collateral Consequences of Conviction Act 
4. Many criminal defendants are sentenced to little or no jail time upon conviction. See 
Gabriel J. Chin, What Are Defense Lawyers For? Links Between Collateral Consequences and 
the Criminal Process, 45 TEX. TECH L. REV. 151, 153 nn.19-21, 54 n.22 (2012) (observing that 
79 percent of all convictions are for misdemeanors and that approximately only 20 percent of 
those cases result in any term of incarceration; also observing that 60 percent of all felony 
convictions result in little or no incarceration). But nearly every conviction carries with it one 
or more collateral consequences. See Michael Pinard, Reflections and Perspectives on Reentry 
and Collateral Consequences, 100 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1213, 1214 (2010) ("All indi-
viduals convicted of criminal offenses, regardless of their sentences, are forced to confront the 
various collateral consequences-additional legal penalties-that result from their con-
victions."). 
5. See infra notes 83, 90 and accompanying text. 
6. Chin, supra note 4, at 153-54. 
7. Catherine L. Carpenter & Amy E. Beverlin, The Evolution of Unconstitutionality in 
Sex Offender Registration Laws, 63 HASTINGS L.J. 1071, 1087 (2012). 
8. Conrad Kahn, Challenging the Federal Prohibition on Gun Possession by Nonviolent 
Felons, 55 S. TEX. L. REV. 113, 113-14 (2013). 
9. See Heidi Altman, Prosecuting Post-Padilla: State Interests and the Pursuit of Justice 
for Noncitizen Defendants, 101 GEO. L.J. 1, 9-11 (2012). 
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correctly observed, "collateral consequences in many instances are 
what is really at stake, the real point of achieving a conviction."10 
The second key point involves the relationship between collateral 
consequences and adjudicatory procedures. Collateral consequences 
are generally deemed irrelevant for determining what procedural 
safeguards must be afforded a criminal defendant. 11 Felony defen-
dants possess a bundle of heightened procedural entitlements-such 
as rights to a grand jury, a preliminary hearing, increased discov-
ery, and a jury trial-that misdemeanor defendants are often 
denied. 12 Critically, the fact that a misdemeanor conviction will 
result in a severe collateral consequence does not trigger any 
heightened procedural protections. 13 
Given these two facts-that collateral consequences are often the 
most important component of a criminal prosecution and that they 
do not trigger heightened procedural protections-it should become 
clear how the attachment of severe collateral consequences to 
misdemeanor offenses affects prosecutorial incentives. Prosecutors 
are more likely to file misdemeanor charges because they can still 
achieve the penalty they desire without having to endure the 
greater costs generated by felony prosecutions.14 
At first blush, the choice to file a misdemeanor charge involving 
a severe collateral consequence may appear to be a win-win for both 
sides: prosecutors can pursue the case in a more efficient manner, 
10. UNIF. COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF CONVICTION ACT, Prefatory Note at 4 (NAT'L 
CONFERENCE OF COMM'RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS 2010) [hereinafter UNIF. ACT]; see also Chin, 
supra note 4, at 161-62 ("Congress and state legislatures have made imposing collateral 
consequences on individuals one of the central functions of the criminal justice system."); 
Gabriel J. Chin & Richard W. Holmes, Jr., Effective Assistance of Counsel and the Con-
sequences of Guilty Pleas, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 697, 699 (2002) ("[T]he imposition of collateral 
consequences has become an increasingly central purpose of the modern criminal process."). 
11. See infra note 254 and accompanying text. 
12. See infra Part H.B. To be clear, not all misdemeanor defendants are deprived of all 
such safeguards. For example, some misdemeanor defendants enjoy a constitutional right to 
a jury trial. See Blanton v. City of N. Las Vegas, 489 U.S. 538, 542 (1989) (holding that de-
fendants charged with an offense that threatens more than six months imprisonment have 
a right to a jury trial). 
13. See Alexandra Natapoff, Misdemeanors, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 1313, 1325 (2012). 
14. The incentive to file misdemeanor charges can be further strengthened by the fact that 
misdemeanors are often easier to prove than felony offenses. Among other things, misde-
meanor offenses tend to have fewer elements and relaxed mens rea requirements. See infra 
notes 17 4-78 and accompanying text. 
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and the defendant is exposed to less potential incarceration.15 But, 
as is frequently the case with first glances, the full picture is more 
complicated-especially for criminal defendants. The decision of 
what charge to initially file can have a domino effect on nearly every 
other aspect of the case: the procedures afforded the defendant, the 
identity of the prosecutor handling the case, the identity of the de-
fense attorney charged with holding the government to its burden 
(or negotiating a favorable plea), and the identity of the judge 
managing the case to its conclusion.16 On each of those fronts, the 
defendant who is charged with a misdemeanor may be left at a 
greater disadvantage than if he had been charged with a felony. 
Felony defendants enjoy a bundle of procedural safeguards that 
misdemeanor defendants typically do not. 17 These safeguards are 
designed not only to ensure fair and accurate adjudications but also 
to provide defendants with meaningful bargaining chips during 
negotiations.18 Moreover, misdemeanor prosecutors are usually the 
most junior members of the office and tend to be harsher than their 
felony colleagues.19 They are accordingly less likely to bargain away 
potential penalties on equitable grounds alone. 20 As for misdemean-
or defense attorneys, they tend to be the least experienced while 
carrying the most voluminous caseloads.21 Consequently, a mean-
ingful vetting of the government's case is usually the exception and 
not the rule. Finally, misdemeanor courts suffer the most acute 
docket pressures, meaning that those judges are likely to prioritize 
speed and docket clearance above all else.22 
This Article proposes that collateral consequences be considered 
when determining what procedural safeguards must be afforded 
defendants. Under existing law, that determination rests almost 
entirely on the maximum term of incarceration authorized by the 
charged offense. But this longstanding approach fails to reflect an 
15. See Chin, supra note 4, at 153-54. 
16. See infra Part II.B. 
17. See infra Part Il.B. 
18. See Josh Bowers, Punishing the Innocent, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1117, 1151-52 (2008). 
19. See infra Part III.C. 
20. See Ronald F. Wright & Kay L. Levine, The Cure for Young Prosecutors' Syndrome, 
56 ARIZ. L. REV. 1065, 1087-88 (2014). 
21. See infra notes 237-39 and accompanying text. 
22. See infra notes 229-32 and accompanying text. 
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important new reality: severe penalties in the form of collateral 
consequences are no longer reserved for felony convictions but are 
now triggered by misdemeanor convictions as well. As detailed 
below, adoption of this proposal could have several salutary effects 
on the administration of collateral consequences. At a minimum, it 
would honor a basic principle underlying our criminal justice sys-
tem: the threat of serious penalties warrants serious procedures. 
By examining how the attachment of certain collateral conse-
quences to misdemeanor offenses influences prosecutorial charging 
decisions in low-level prosecutions, this Article makes two contri-
butions to the scholarly literature. 
The first is to enrich our understanding of the various charging 
options available in a prosecutor's toolbox. Much ink has been 
spilled-and rightly so-about the strategy known as overcharg-
ing. 23 This Article identifies an additional charging tactic that has 
eluded scholarly attention thus far-a practice I term "strategic 
undercharging." A prosecutor engages in strategic undercharging 
when she charges a lesser offense than she otherwise could, but 
she does so for reasons that advance her own prosecutorial aims 
and not as an act of grace or leniency. The conventional wisdom, 
which is rooted in the lessons of overcharging, is that prosecutors 
file the most severe charges available.24 This Article complicates 
that narrative by explaining why, at least in certain contexts, 
23. At the risk of oversimplification, a prosecutor engages in overcharging when she 
charges a case more severely than she ultimately thinks is warranted-by filing either more 
charges or a single charge at a higher level than she ultimately thinks the case merits. The 
prosecutor can then use the threat of "unduly harsh potential punishments" as "leverage in 
bargaining, offering substantial so·called concessions that merely lead to convictions and 
sentences only on the warranted charges." Bowers, supra note 18, at 1155. 
For a very small sampling of the extensive literature examining overcharging, see Albert 
W. Alschuler, The Prosecutor's Role in Plea Bargaining, 36 U. CHI. L. REV. 50, 85· 105 (1968) 
(explaining the difference between horizontal overcharging and vertical overcharging); Tracey 
L. Meares, Rewards for Good Behavior: Influencing Prosecutorial Discretion and Conduct with 
Financial Incentives, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 851, 862-73 (1995); Robert E. Scott & William J. 
Stuntz, Plea Bargaining as Contract, 101 YALE L.J. 1909, 1960-65 (1992). 
24. See, e.g., ANGELA J. DAVIS, ARBITRARY JUSTICE: THE POWER OF THE AMERICAN 
PROSECUTOR 31 (2009) ("Prosecutors routinely engage in overcharging, a practice that involves 
'tacking on' additional charges that they know they cannot prove beyond a reasonable doubt 
or that they can technically prove but are inconsistent with the legislative intent or otherwise 
inappropriate."); Meares, supra note 23, at 868-69 (claiming that"[ o]vercharging is systemic" 
and that prosecutors "often believe that it is in [their] best interests to charge the defendant 
with the most serious and as many crimes at the outset of the case"). 
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prosecutors will not reflexively file the most serious charge pos-
sible.25 Prosecutors will sometimes exercise their charging preroga-
tive by filing a lesser charge and, in so doing, gain the strategic 
advantage that comes from significantly reducing a defendant's 
procedural entitlements. 
The second contribution that this Article makes is to shine a light 
on the relationship between collateral consequences and procedural 
safeguards. Scholars have thoroughly examined collateral conse-
quences and the right to counsel, including the advice defendants 
are constitutionally entitled to receive about potential consequences 
of conviction. 26 But whether potential collateral consequences should 
impact a defendant's procedural entitlements has escaped sustained 
scholarly scrutiny. This Article begins to remedy that gap by 
interrogating the continued wisdom of relying solely on potential 
imprisonment as the metric for determining the procedural safe-
guards afforded a defendant. 
The Article proceeds in four Parts. Part I provides background 
information about collateral consequences, their expansion into the 
universe of misdemeanor offenses, and their relative importance to 
prosecutors in low-level cases. Part II examines the incentives that 
25. See infra Part II. 
26. See generally Gabriel J. Chin, Making Padilla Practical: Defense Counsel and 
Collateral Consequences at Guilty Plea, 54 How. L.J. 675 (2011); Chin, supra note 4; Alice 
Clapman, Petty Offenses, Drastic Consequences: Toward a Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel 
for Noncitizen Defendants Facing Deportation, 33 CARDOZO L. REV. 585 (2011); Chin & 
Holmes, supra note 10; John D. King, Beyond "Life and Liberty''.· The Evolving Right to 
Counsel, 48 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 28 n.170 (2013); Jenny Roberts, Ignorance Is Effectively 
Bliss: Collateral Consequences, Silence, and Misinformation in the Guilty-Plea Process, 95 
IOWA L. REV. 119 (2009) [hereinafter Roberts, Ignorance]; Jenny Roberts, Proving Prejudice, 
Post-Padilla, 54 How. L.J. 693 (2011); McGregor Smyth, Holistic Is Not a Bad Word: A 
Criminal Defense Attorney's Guide to Using Invisible Punishments as an Advocacy Strategy, 
36 U. TOLEDO L. REV. 4 79 (2005). The recent scholarly focus on defense counsel and advice is 
unsurprising given that it was the subject at issue in Padilla v. Kentucky. See 559 U.S. 356, 
359-60 (2010). 
By contrast, examination of the influence that collateral consequences have on prosecutors 
and their charging decisions has been minimal. See, e.g., MARGARET COLGATE LOVE ET AL., 
COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF CRIMINAL CONVICTIONS: LAW, POLICY AND PRACTICE § 8:3 
(2013) ("[T]here has been little attention paid to whether prosecutors should take collateral 
consequences into account when making charging decisions."); Altman, supra note 9, at 8 
("The role of the prosecutor ... has been largely unaddressed in the literature and advocacy 
materials that have emerged since Padilla."). Altman's article appears to be the main 
exception to this trend. However, her article focuses exclusively on the role deportation plays 
during plea bargaining and not its impact on initial charging decisions. See id. at 7. 
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lead prosecutors to engage in strategic undercharging when a severe 
collateral consequence is triggered by a misdemeanor offense. Part 
III explores some of the ripple effects caused by a decision to file a 
misdemeanor instead of a felony. Part IV explains why collateral 
consequences should be considered when determining what proce-
dural safeguards are afforded a defendant. 
I. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES 
This Part describes the key role collateral consequences often play 
in low-level criminal prosecutions. Section A summarizes the dis-
tinction between collateral and direct consequences. Section B 
explains that misdemeanor offenses increasingly trigger significant 
collateral consequences, thereby eroding the sharp felony-misde-
meanor divide that previously existed for collateral consequences. 
Section C identifies the collateral consequences that have the most 
salience from the perspective of prosecutors. Finally, Section D de-
scribes why prosecutors often view the imposition of one or more 
collateral consequences as the core objective of many low-level pro-
secutions. 
A. Collateral Consequences vs. Direct Consequences 
The legal consequences that flow from a criminal conviction are 
often divided into two groups: direct and collateral. 27 Although there 
27. See Jenny Roberts, The Mythical Divide Between Collateral and Direct Consequences 
of Criminal Convictions: Involuntary Commitment of "Sexually Violent Predators," 93 MINN. 
L. REV. 670, 678 (2008). Of course, criminal convictions can also have significant nonlegal 
consequences, including adverse effects on private employment prospects and various forms 
of social stigma. See John Bronsteen et al., Happiness and Punishment, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 
1037, 1049-55 (2009) ("Researchers have discovered that any amount of incarceration creates 
a significantly higher likelihood that ex-inmates will suffer a variety of health-related, 
economic, and social harms with substantial negative hedonic consequences."). See generally 
INVISIBLE PUNISHMENT: THE COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF MAss IMPRISONMENT (Marc 
Mauer & Meda Chesney-Lind eds., 2002) [hereinafter INVISIBLE PUNISHMENT]; Wayne A. 
Logan, Informal Collateral Consequences, 88 WASH. L. REV. 1103 (2013); Michael Pinard, An 
Integrated Perspective on the Collateral Consequences of Criminal Convictions and Reentry 
Issues Faced by Formerly Incarcerated Individuals, 86 B.U. L. REV. 623, 624 n.1 (2006) 
(collecting sources). Although the term "collateral consequences" has occasionally been used 
to refer to nonlegal consequences, my use of the phrase is limited to a conviction's legally-
imposed consequences. See LOVE ET AL., supra note 26, § 1:8. 
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is some dispute over how to define each category precisely,28 the best 
rule of thumb-and the one that the Supreme Court suggests in its 
landmark decision in Padilla v. Kentucky-is that direct conse-
quences are limited to those matters "within the sentencing author-
ity of the state [or federal] trial court."29 A collateral consequence, 
by contrast, is any sanction or disability imposed by law as a result 
of a criminal conviction that is in addition to the conviction's direct 
consequences.30 In other words, collateral consequences "are not 
part of the explicit punishment handed down by the court; they stem 
from the fact of conviction rather than from the sentence of the 
court."31 
There is general consensus that incarceration, fines, criminal 
forfeiture, and terms of probation or supervised release are all direct 
consequences of conviction. 32 Collateral consequences are generally 
understood to include sex offender registration, civil commitment, 
civil forfeiture, firearm prohibitions, disenfranchisement, preclusion 
from juror service, bans on running for public office, disqualification 
from public benefits (such as public housing or food assistance), 
ineligibility for business and professional licenses, termination or 
limitation of parental rights, and-for noncitizen defendants- de-
portation. 33 
28. See Padilla, 559 U.S. at 364 n.8; Roberts, supra note 27, at 689-93 (detailing how 
courts have used at least three different formulations when articulating the line between 
direct and collateral consequences). 
29. 559 U.S. at 364. Commentators have similarly emphasized the role and authority of 
the sentencing court when attempting to delineate the realm of collateral consequences. See 
LOVE ET AL., supra note 26, § 1:8 ("[W]e endorse 'collateral consequences' as a generally 
serviceable (if not entirely precise) term to describe the range of legal penalties and 
disabilities that flow from a criminal conviction over and above the sentence imposed by the 
court."). A focus on the sentencing authority of the trial court makes particular sense given 
the origins of the collateral consequence rule. See infra notes 34-36 and accompanying tex:t. 
30. See, e.g., Court Security Improvement Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-177, § 510(d), 121 
Stat. 2534, 2544 (2008); UNIF. ACT, supra note 10, § 2(1)-(2). 
31. Pinard, supra note 27, at 634. 
32. See Roberts, Ignorance, supra note 26, at 124. 
33. See Chaidez v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 1103, 1108 n.5 (2013); Padilla, 559 U.S. at 
376 (Alito, J., concurring); Chin & Holmes, supra note 10, at 705-06. 
Some collateral consequences are mandatory in nature, whereas others afford the perti-
nent decision maker some degree of discretion when determining whether to apply them. 
The former, which are also known as "collateral sanctions," typically apply immediately 
and automatically upon conviction. See Court Security Improvement Act of 2007 
§ 510(d)(2). Common examples include sex offender registration, disenfranchisement, and 
firearm prohibitions. Discretionary "disqualifications," on the other hand, involve penalties 
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The distinction between direct and collateral consequences first 
gained legal prominence following the Supreme Court's decision in 
Brady v. United States. 34 Brady established that, in order to comply 
with the Due Process Clause's voluntariness requirement, a trial 
court needs to ensure only that a defendant is aware of the "direct 
consequences" of conviction before entering a guilty plea. 35 In other 
words, a trial court has no obligation to inform a defendant of a con-
viction's potential collateral consequences before it accepts the plea 
as valid. 
Although Brady involved only a trial court's constitutional duties 
during plea colloquies, it reflected a view that later took root in 
several other criminal law domains: a conviction's collateral conse-
quences do not warrant the same degree of procedural attention as 
a conviction's direct consequences. 36 
B. The Erosion of the Felony-Misdemeanor Line 
The classification of offenses as felonies or misdemeanors has 
long been a foundational aspect of the American criminal justice 
system. 37 Among other things, the penalties facing the defendant 
typically turned on that classification.38 In most jurisdictions, fel-
onies are defined as offenses that authorize more than one year of 
imprisonment, whereas misdemeanors are offenses that authorize 
no more than one year of imprisonment. 39 
or disabilities "that an administrative agency, official, or a court in a civil proceeding is 
authorized, but not required, to impose on an individual convicted" of an offense. Id. 
§ 510(d)(3); see STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: COi.LATERAL SANCTIONS & DISCRETION-
ARY DISQUALIFICATION OF CONVICTED PERSONS, § 19-1. l (AM. BAR AsS'N 2004). 
34. 397 U.S. 742 (1970); see also Chin & Holmes, supra note 10, at 706, 726-30 (discussing 
Brady). Brady was not, however, the first time that the Supreme Court had considered the 
potential relevance of collateral consequences. In a line of cases beginning in the 1940s, the 
Supreme Court held that a criminal defendant's appeal of his conviction was not rendered 
moot by the completion of his sentence of incarceration, so long as he remained subject to 
potential collateral consequences from the challenged conviction. See Sibron v. New York, 392 
U.S. 40, 53-55, 57-58 (1968) (summarizing earlier decisions); Fiswick v. United States, 329 
U.S. 211, 222 (1946). 
35. Brady, 397 U.S. at 755 (quoting Shelton v. United States, 246 F.2d 571, 572 n.2 (5th 
Cir. 1957)). 
36. See Chin & Holmes, supra note 10, at 703-08. 
37. See 1 WAYNER.LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINALPROCEDURE§ 1.8(c) (3ded. 2007). 
38. See id. 
39. See id. 
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Although the line formally dividing felonies and misdemeanors 
is a prison-centric one, a substantial part of what previously dis-
tinguished felonies from misdemeanors was the number and sever-
ity of collateral consequences that flowed from a conviction.40 Until 
relatively recently, only a felony conviction could trigger the ma-
jority of collateral consequences.41 As Chief Justice Warren observed 
in 1960, "[c]onviction of a felony imposes a status upon a person 
which not only makes him vulnerable to future sanctions through 
new civil disability statutes, but which also seriously affects his 
reputation and economic opportunities."42 
Since the 1990s, however, more and more collateral consequences 
are triggered by misdemeanor convictions.43 As a result, the sharp 
40. Indeed, this historic divide dates back to the English common law, where "[n]o crime 
was considered a felony which did not occasion a total forfeiture of the offender's lands, or 
goods, or both." United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 439 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting) 
(quoting Kurtz v. Moffitt, 115 U.S. 487, 499 (1885)). 
41. See King, supra note 26, at 32 ("Conviction of serious crime has long carried the 
consequence of 'civil death,' by which the offender ... forfeited certain fundamental social 
rights. But whereas the historical phenomenon of civil death was limited in the past to the 
most serious categories of criminal activity, the current trend over the last quarter-century 
has been to alienate and exclude offenders through collateral consequences, even when 
convicted of very minor convictions.") (footnote omitted); see, e.g., Walter Matthews Grant et 
al., Special Project, The Collateral Consequences of a Criminal Conviction, 23 V AND. L. REV. 
929, 955-56 (1970) (outlining the breadth of civil disabilities statutes imposing collateral 
consequences on convictions). To be sure, some misdemeanor offenses resulted in collateral 
consequences as well. See, e.g., Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 48 n.11 (1972) (Powell, 
J., concurring) ("A wide range of civil disabilities may result from misdemeanor convictions, 
such as forfeiture of public office, disqualification for a licensed profession, and loss of pension 
rights.") (citations omitted). But the increase in collateral consequences attaching to mis-
demeanors and minor convictions is relatively recent. See Pinard, supra note 4, at 1214-15 
("[W]hat is relatively new is the scope of collateral consequences that burden individuals long 
past the expiration of their sentences and which ... frustrate their ability to move past their 
criminal records. At no point in United States history have collateral consequences been as 
expansive and entrenched as they are today."); see also King, supra note 26, at 17-33 (de-
scribing the dramatic increase in scope and severity of collateral consequences of minor crim-
inal convictions). 
42. Parker v. Ellis, 362 U.S. 574, 593-94 (1960) (Warren, C.J., dissenting); see also 
Baldasar v. Illinois, 446 U.S. 222, 227 (1980) (Marshall, J., concurring) (highlighting the 
gravity of an offense being "transformed from a misdemeanor into a felony" because of "all the 
serious collateral consequences that a felony conviction entails"); Blackledge v. Perry, 417 
U.S. 21, 28 n.6 (1974) (''Moreover, even putting to one side the potentiality of increased 
incarceration, conviction of a 'felony' often entails more serious collateral consequences than 
those incurred through a misdemeanor conviction."). 
43. See Nora V. Demleitner, Preventing Internal Exile: The Need for Restrictions on 
Collateral Sentencing Consequences, 11 STAN. L. & POL'YREV. 153, 154-55 (1999) (discussing 
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ness of the distinction between felonies and misdemeanors-at least 
in terms of post-conviction consequences-has been dulled.44 
C. Collateral Consequences and Prosecutors 
Although scholars have primarily focused on how collateral 
consequences impact d~fendants and defense attorneys,45 these con-
sequences can also play an important role in how prosecutors charge 
(and later negotiate) a case. Indeed, the National Prosecution 
Standards promulgated by the National District Attorneys Associa-
tion, 46 the United States Attorneys' Manual,47 and the American 
the history of the scope of collateral consequences); Roberts, supra note 27, at 673-74 ("The 
number and severity of collateral consequences, including increasing bars to employment and 
housing, have greatly expanded in recent years. Many of these consequences now apply to 
relatively minor criminal convictions, and even to certain noncriminal convictions.") (footnote 
omitted). 
The recent upsurge in misdemeanor convictions triggering collateral consequences is 
merely one part of an overall explosion of collateral consequences over the last three decades. 
See Roberts, supra note 27, at 701. Extensive literature details how and why legislatures 
increasingly adopted collateral consequences beginning in the late 1980s. See, e.g., JEREMY 
TRAVIS, BUT THEY ALL COME BACK: FACING THE CHALLENGES OF PRISONER REENTRY 66-68 
(2005); Kevin G. Buckler & Lawrence F. Travis III, Reanalyzing the Prevalence and Social 
Context of Collateral Consequence Statutes, 31 J. CRIM. JUST. 435, 451 (2003); Demleitner, 
supra note 43, at 154-55; Pinard, supra note 4, at 1217-19. 
44. See Jenny Roberts, Why Misdemeanors Matter: Defining Effective Advocacy in the 
Lower Criminal Courts, 45 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 277, 292 (2011) ("[H]owever a particular crime 
is labeled, the collateral consequences of misdemeanor convictions render less significant the 
line between felonies-at least low-level ones-and misdemeanors."). 
45. For the effect collateral consequences have on defendants, see generally INVISIBLE 
PuNISHMENT, supra note 27; TRAVIS, supra note 43; Gabriel J. Chin, Race, the War on Drugs, 
and the Collateral Consequences of Criminal Conviction, 6 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 253 
(2002); Demleitner, supra note 43; Pinard, supra note 27; Michael Pinard, Collateral Con· 
sequences of Criminal Convictions: Confronting Issues of Race and Dignity, 85 N. Y. U. L. REV. 
457 (2010). And for the effect collateral consequences have on defense attorneys, see supra 
note 26. 
46. See NAT'L PROSECUTION STANDARDS, §§ 4-1.3, 4-2.4 (NAT'L DIST. ATIORNEYS Ass'N 
2009), http://www.ndaa.org/pdf/NDAA%20NPS%203rd%20Ed. %20w%20Revised%20Commen 
tary.pdf [https://perma.cc/HNX6-WAJR]; see also Chin & Holmes, supra note 10, at 720 & 
n.202. 
47. See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE [DOJ], UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS' MANuAL §§ 9-27.230, 
9-27.240, 9-27.250 (2014), http://www.justice.gov/usam/usam-9-27000-principles-federal-
prosecution [https://perma.cc/XB9H-RN5X]. Interestingly, the Manual's most extensive 
discussion of collateral consequences is found in the section titled "Principles of Federal 
Prosecution of Business Organizations." Id.§ 9-28.1000. 
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Bar Association's Criminal Justice Standards48 all recommend that 
prosecutors consider potential collateral consequences when mak-
ing initial charging decisions.49 
To be sure, prosecutors will not always know every potential 
collateral consequence facing a defendant when deciding what 
charges, if any, to file in a given case. 50 But they will know many of 
them, including several of the most severe ones. This is especially 
true for those collateral consequences that are automatically trig-
gered by a conviction for a particular offense, and therefore do not 
vary according to the individual characteristics of the defendant. 51 
For example, "a prosecutor will or should know ... which sex offenses 
lead to registration so that this can be taken into account in the 
charging decision."52 
For purposes of deciding what charges to file, prosecutors care 
about some consequences more than others. For example, prose-
cutors will be most interested in imposing collateral consequences 
that further the varied purposes of criminal prosecution, such as 
deterrence, retribution, rehabilitation, or incapacitation (or some 
combination thereof).53 In particular, prosecutors are often animat-
ed by a desire to reduce threats to public safety.54 Collateral con-
sequences that advance that goal are therefore likely to be penalties 
of particular interest to prosecutors. 55 
48. See STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FuNCTION AND DEFENSE FuNC-
TION § 3-3.9(b) (AM. BARASS'N 1993). 
49. See LOVE ET AL., supra note 26, § 8:3; Chin & Holmes, supra note 10, at 720-21; see 
also Robert M.A. Johnson, Collateral Consequences, 16 CRIM. JUST. 32, 33 (2001) (advising all 
prosecutors to "comprehend this full range of consequences that flow from a crucial convic-
tion"). 
50. See LOVE ET AL., supra note 26, § 8:3. 
51. See id. ("There are some cases where a prosecutor will or should know about potential 
collateral consequences even before filing formal charges."); Robert M.A. Johnson, A Prose-
cutor's Expanded Responsibilities Under Padilla, 31 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 129, 133 (2011). 
52. LOVE ET AL., supra note 26, § 8:3. 
53. See DOJ, supra note 4 7, § 9-27.300 (identifying the "purposes of criminal law as 
punishment, protection of the public, specific and general deterrence, and rehabilitation"). 
54. See, e.g., Johnson, supra note 51, at 131 (explaining that the "primary objectives" of 
sentencing "are protecting the public from future crime by the offender and punishing the 
offender"). 
55. Prosecutors are typically less concerned with other types of collateral consequences, 
such as voter disenfranchisement or disqualification from juror service. As one former pro-
secutor I interviewed explained, "I never thought about voting [rights]" when making charging 
decisions. Telephone Interview with Individual G, Former Prosecutor (June 5, 2015) 
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Beginning in the 1990s, legislatures greatly expanded the number 
and availability of collateral consequences that seek to curtail fu-
ture risks to public safety.56 Three prominent examples are sex 
offender registration, firearm prohibitions, and deportation.57 Each 
is aimed, at least in part, at reducing threats to public safety.58 And, 
critically, each is now triggered not only by certain felony convic-
tions but also by a variety of misdemeanor offenses.59 
1. Sex Offender Registration 
In 1986, four states had laws requiring certain sex offenders to 
register with law enforcement.60 Twelve years later, all fifty states 
and the District of Columbia ''had enacted legislation requiring that 
convicted sex offenders register with the police upon release from 
[hereinafter Interview with G]. For more details about my interviews with current and former 
prosecutors, see infra note 118. The point, of course, is not that such consequences are trivial 
(they are not), but rather that, from the prosecutor's perspective, they rarely move the 
charging needle one way or the other. 
56. For example, one quantitative study published in 2003 found a "sharp rise in [leg-
islatures'] use of firearm restrictions, sex offender registration statutes, and the termination 
of parental rights." Buckler & Travis, supra note 43, at 451; see also Demleitner, supra note 
43, at 155. 
57. These are not the only collateral consequences aimed at minimizing future threats to 
public safety. Additional examples include the termination or limitation of a defendant's 
parental rights and involuntary civil commitment as a "sexually violent predator." For a dis-
cussion of the latter, see, for example, Roberts, supra note 27, at 703-09 (noting that the first 
statute authorizing the civil commitment of persons deemed "sexually violent predators" was 
passed in 1990 and that now the federal government, twenty states, and the District of 
Columbia permit involuntary commitment on such grounds). 
58. For an analysis of whether sex offender registration laws actually promote public 
safety, see generally Amanda Y. Agan, Sex Offender Registries: Fear Without Function?, 54 
J.L. & ECON. 207 (2011) (questioning the effectiveness of sex offender registries). For a 
discussion of whether the federal firearms ban for misdemeanor domestic violence has suc-
cessfully incapacitated domestic abusers, see Robert A. Mikos, Enforcing State Law in 
Congress's Shadow, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 1411, 1459-60 (2005). And for a thoughtful exam-
ination of the public safety rationale commonly offered as a justification for conviction-based 
deportation, see generally Daniel Kanstroom, Deportation, Social Control, and Punishment: 
Some Thoughts About Why Hard Laws Make Bad Cases, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1890 (2000). 
59. See, e.g., Stephanos Bibas, Shrinking Gideon and Expanding Alternatives to Lawyers, 
70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1287, 1299 (2013) ("[S]ome misdemeanors carry grave, nearly au-
tomatic collateral consequences such as deportation [and] sex-offender confinement or 
registration."). 
60. TRAVIS, supra note 43, at 67; Buckler & Travis, supra note 43, at 443. 
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prison."61 The obligation to register as a sex offender typically ap-
plies automatically upon conviction of a registerable offense, as 
defined by the pertinent jurisdiction.62 Today, the vast majority of 
jurisdictions include some misdemeanors in their lists of register-
able offenses.63 Registration periods range from fifteen years to life, 
depending on the jurisdiction and qualifying offense. 64 
2. Firearm Prohibitions 
Congress first forbade the possession of firearms by certain crim-
inal offenders in 1938,65 and eventually prohibited all felons from 
possessing a firearm in 1968.66 It did not limit the ability of mis-
demeanants to possess firearms, however, until 1996.67 Congress 
made it unlawful for any person "who has been convicted in any 
court of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence" to purchase or 
possess a firearm that has travelled in interstate commerce.68 In 
addition to the federal ban, fifteen states and the District of 
Columbia currently prohibit the possession of firearms by persons 
convicted of misdemeanor domestic violence offenses. 69 Firearm 
61. TRAVIS, supra note 43, at 68; see Buckler & Travis, supra note 43, at 443. 
62. For a helpful summary of the numerous and onerous obligations currently imposed 
on sex offenders, as well as expanded community notification schemes, see Carpenter & 
Beverlin, supra note 7, at 1087-95. 
63. See King, supra note 26, at 28; Roberts, supra note 44, at 298-99; see also, e.g., N.Y. 
CORRECT. LAW§ 168-a (McKinney 2011) (listing five misdemeanors as registerable offenses). 
64. See, e.g., Carpenter & Beverlin, supra note 7, at 1087 ("Today, a tier I offender [the 
least serious offender] generally must register for a minimum of fifteen years or, often, twenty 
years. Additionally, many more crimes today have been assigned lifetime registration or re-
cast to require lifetime registration.") (footnotes omitted). 
65. Federal Firearms Act, Pub. L. No. 75-785, 52 Stat. 1250 (1938); Kahn, supra note 8, 
at 113. 
66. Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351, 82 Stat. 197; 
Gun Control Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-618, 82 Stat. 1213; see also C. Kevin Marshall, Why 
Can't Martha Stewart Have a Gun?, 32 HARV. J .L. & PUB. POL 'y 695, 698 (2009). 
67. See Mikos, supra note 58, at 1457 & n.153 (discussing Congress's desire to prevent gun 
possession by misdemeanor domestic violence offenders). 
68. Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act, 1997, Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 658, 110 Stat. 
3009, 3009-371 (1996) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9)); see 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(33)(A) (2012) 
(defining a "misdemeanor crime of domestic violence" to include state and federal misde-
meanor offenses). 
69. See Domestic Violence & Firearms Policy Summary, LAW CTR. TO PREVENT GUN VIO-
LENCE (May 11, 2014), http:f/smartgunlaws.org/domestic-violence-firearms-policy-summary/ 
[https://perma.cc/W2UH-ADHH]. 
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prohibitions typically apply automatically and immediately upon 
conviction of a qualifying offense. 
3. Deportation 70 
The laws governing deportation were largely overhauled in the 
1990s.71 Among other things, Congress "increased the number of 
crimes triggering deportation."72 Most relevant here, Congress signi-
ficantly expanded the number of misdemeanor offenses that render 
a noncitizen deportable. 73 For example, Congress made a conviction 
for any offense "relating to a controlled substance"-subject to one 
narrow exception involving minor marijuana possession-automatic 
grounds for deportation. 74 Congress likewise made a wide swath of 
The existence of federal and state firearms bans highlights another notable feature of 
collateral consequences: they can be imposed by more than one sovereign. Although a convic-
tion's direct consequences invariably are levied by the same jurisdiction that prosecuted the 
offense, a conviction's collateral consequences are not so limited. For example, a state court 
conviction may yield both state and federal collateral consequences. This dynamic permits 
prosecutors to leverage collateral consequences that are imposed by separate sovereigns. 
70. The Court in Padilla observed that deportation is "uniquely difficult to classify as 
either a direct or a collateral consequence." Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 366 (2010). In 
my view, however, deportation is still best understood to be a collateral consequence for at 
least two reasons. First, the great weight of authority preceding Padilla consistently classified 
deportation as a collateral consequence, see, e.g., Roberts, Ignorance, supra note 26, at 132, 
and Padilla expressly avoided upsetting that nearly uniform precedent. Second, the Supreme 
Court's reticence to classify deportation as a collateral consequence appeared to dissipate in 
its subsequent decision in Chaidez v. United States, in which it described deportation as a 
collateral consequence on multiple occasions. See 133 S. Ct. 1103, 1108 (2013). In any event, 
my central claim does not hinge on whether deportation is in fact classified as a collateral or 
direct consequence, because it is not accounted for when determining which set of adjudi-
catory procedures are required in a given case. 
71. See, e.g., Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 
110 Stat. 1214; Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. 
L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-546; Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, 104 Stat. 
4978, 5050. Congress first made certain criminal convictions a basis for deportation in 1917. 
See Padilla, 559 U.S. at 361 (describing the enactment of The Immigration Act of 1917). 
72. Mikos, supra note 58, at 1444 n.93; see also Juliet Stumpf, Fitting Punishment, 66 
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1683, 1722-25 (2009). 
73. See Jason A. Cade, The Plea-Bargain Crisis for Noncitizens in Misdemeanor Court, 34 
CARDOZO L. REV. 1751, 1758-63 (2013); Clapman, supra note 26, at 591; Stephen Lee, De Facto 
Immigration Courts, 101 CALIF. L. REV. 553, 560-61 (2013). Congress also eliminated most 
statutory forms of relief and abolished a sentencing court's ability to prevent deportation 
through a procedure known as a "judicial recommendation against deportation." Padilla, 559 
U.S. at 361-64; see also Mikos, supra note 58, at 1444 n.93. 
74. See 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i) (2012); see also Padilla, 559 U.S. at 368; Cade, supra 
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offenses involving domestic violence and child abuse grounds for 
deportation.75 In short, a large number of "misdemeanors-a cate-
gory of crimes where those convicted often serve no jail tim~an 
lead to removal."76 And they often do. 77 
D. Collateral Consequences and Low-Level Prosecutions 
To the extent that the current scholarly literature discusses the 
impact collateral consequences have on prosecutors, it tends to fo-
cus on the exceptional case. Commentators often highlight instances 
in which the prosecutor believes the imposition of a particular 
consequence is unwarranted, and the prosecutor is then forced to 
engage in various charging machinations in order to avoid trigger-
ing that consequence. 78 
But that is not the typical case. 79 More commonly, the prosecutor 
thinks the consequence is not only justified but also important. 
Indeed, for cases involving only low-grade felonies or misdemeanors, 
securing one of the aforementioned collateral consequences will 
note 73, at 1760. 
75. See 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(E)(i). 
76. Lee, supra note 73, at 561. 
77. See, e.g., Altman, supra note 9, at 14; Ginger Thompson & Sarah Cohen, More 
Deportations Follow Minor Crimes, Records Show, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 6, 2014), http://www. 
nytimes.com/2014/04/07/us/more-deportations-follow-minor-crimes-data-shows.html?_r=O 
[https://perma.cc/7P8M-PDVS]. The Obama Administration's recent actions regarding im-
migration enforcement continues to prioritize the removal of persons convicted of crimes, 
including several classes of defendants convicted only of misdemeanor offenses. See Mem-
orandum from Jeh Charles Johnson, Sec'y, U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., to Thomas S. 
Winkowski, Acting Dir., U.S. Immigration & Customs Enft, et al., Policies for the Appre-
hension, Detention and Removal of Undocumented Immigrants (Nov. 20, 2014), http://www. 
dhs.gov/si tes/default/files/pu blications/14_ 1120_memo_prosecutorial_discretion. pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/L5JQ-U9JA] 
78. The literature is replete with such anecdotes and hypotheticals. See, e.g., Catherine 
A. Christian, Awareness of Collateral Consequences: The Role of the Prosecutor, 30 N. Y. U. REV. 
L. & Soc. CHANGE 621, 622 (2006); Smyth, supra note 26, at 494-96; see also LOVE ET AL., 
supra note 26, §§ 8:3, 8:7. These types of charging decisions are especially pronounced in 
discussions involving deportation. See, e.g., Lee, supra note 73, at 579. 
79. See, e.g., Altman, supra note 9, at 29-32 (reporting that fewer than 5 percent of the 
line prosecutors in King's County, New York (Brooklyn) surveyed responded that they "often" 
or "always" alter a plea offer because of the potential immigration consequences faced by the 
defendant, but approximately 45 percent responded that they "rarely" or "never" did); Ingrid 
V. Eagly, Criminal Justice for Noncitizens: An Analysis of Variation in Local Enforcement, 88 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1126, 1187 (2013) (finding that "immigration consequences are [often] an ex-
press prosecutorial goal of the conviction" in Maricopa County, Arizona). 
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likely be a key-if not the key-prosecutorial objective. This is true 
for several reasons. 
First, the collateral consequence almost always lasts longer than 
the defendant's term of incarceration, which for low-level offenders 
is usually short or nonexistent.8° For example, the obligation to reg-
ister as a sex offender lasts for a minimum of fifteen years and often 
for life.81 The federal prohibition on firearm possession is a lifetime 
ban.82 Similarly, deportation amounts to a permanent exclusion 
from the United States. As a result, a prosecutor may view a col-
lateral consequence of conviction as her most potent and enduring 
weapon against future public safety risks.83 
Second, collateral consequences often expose the defendant to a 
lengthy incarceration term if he violates the pertinent prohibition, 
thereby bolstering the consequence's specific deterrent effect. For 
example, if a defendant fails to register properly as a sex offender, 
he can be charged with a criminal offense punishable by more than 
a decade in prison.84 Similarly, an offender found in unlawful 
custody of a firearm may be sentenced up to ten years in prison.85 
And a deported person who unlawfully reenters the country can be 
prosecuted and imprisoned for that reentry.86 For each of these 
offenses, establishing a violation is usually straightforward and 
typically much easier to prove than the underlying offense that 
triggered the collateral consequence.87 
80. Most felony convictions result in little or no actual jail time. See Bowers, supra note 
18, at 1145 n.139; Chin, supra note 4, at 153-54. And very few misdemeanor defendants spend 
any time in jail. See Chin, supra note 4, at 153-54, 154 n.22 (observing that, between 2006 and 
2010, approximately 20 percent of persons arrested in New York on misdemeanor charges 
were ultimately sentenced to prison or jail). 
81. See supra note 7 and accompanying text. 
82. See supra note 8 and accompanying text. 
83. See, e.g., Demleitner, supra note 43, at 154 ("[F]or many convicted offenders ... these 
'collateral' consequences 'are ... the most persistent punishments that are inflicted for [their] 
crime."' (quoting Velmer S. Burton, Jr., et al., The Collateral Consequences of a Felony Con-
viction: A National Study of State Statutes, FED. PROB., Sept. 1987, at 52)); Roberts, supra 
note 27, at 674 ("[C]ollateral consequences often far outweigh the direct penal sanction of a 
conviction."). 
84. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2250 (2012). 
85. See id. § 924(a). 
86. See 8 U.S.C. § 1326. 
87. Notice how much lighter the government's burden will be in these subsequent cases: 
Did the defendant fail to register properly? Not did the defendant commit a sex offense. Was 
the defendant found in possession of a firearm? Not did the defendant commit an act of 
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Third, many collateral consequences-including two of the three 
highlighted here-represent a guaranteed penalty upon conviction. 
In other words, these collateral consequences cannot be circum-
vented by a sentencing judge, which is significant for prosecutors 
concerned about controlling the penalties imposed on a defendant.ss 
For example, if convicted of a qualifying offense, a defendant will be 
required to register as a sex offender. Firearm prohibitions work 
this way, too. Although deportation is not formally guaranteed, a 
defendant rendered eligible for deportation likely will be removed 
ifhe is later detained by Immigration and Customs Enforcement.s9 
In sum, prosecutors will often be attuned to certain collateral 
consequences that further the goals of criminal prosecution, espe-
cially those aimed at reducing threats to public safety. When it 
comes to low-level offenses, those collateral consequences are often 
the most important goal of a criminal prosecution.90 
II. STRATEGIC UNDERCHARGING: WHY LESS IS SOMETIMES MORE 
As detailed in Part I, several collateral consequences of consider-
able interest to prosecutors are now triggered by misdemeanor 
convictions. This has meaningfully expanded a prosecutor's charging 
domestic violence. Was the defendant found in the country after being removed? Not did the 
defendant commit the deportable offense. 
In addition, the subsequent violations are easier to prove because they typically turn on law 
enforcement witnesses, not lay witnesses. Compared to police witnesses, "lay witnesses are 
less reliable, easier to impeach, and less certain to cooperate with pretrial investigation and 
trial preparation or even to appear and testify in the event of trial." Josh Bowers, Legal Guilt, 
Normative Innocence, and the Equitable Decision Not to Prosecute, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1655, 
1713 (2010). 
88. See, e.g., Johnson, supra note 49 at 33 ("These collateral consequences are simply a 
new form of mandated sentences. Prosecutors have often favored mandated sentences to 
counter the tendencies of some judges who seem incapable of giving serious consequences for 
serious crimes."). In this respect, mandatory collateral consequences operate like mandatory 
minimum prison sentences, which enhance the prosecutor's relative power as she controls the 
penalty through her charging discretion. See Demleitner, supra note 43, at 161; William J. 
Stuntz, Plea Bargaining and Criminal Law's Disappearing Shadow, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2548, 
2562 (2004). 
89. See Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 363-64 (2010) (observing that deportation "is 
practically inevitable" in most cases after a defendant who was convicted of a removable of-
fense has been detained). 
90. See UNIF. ACT, supra note 10, Prefatory Note at 4; Pinard, supra note 27, at 684 
(recognizing "the centrality of collateral consequences to the criminal process"). 
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options. For cases in which imposition of the collateral consequence 
is a crucial prosecutorial aim, an inability to obtain that conse-
quence through a misdemeanor conviction would effectively force 
the prosecutor to bring a felony case. The recent attachment of 
severe collateral consequences to misdemeanor offenses therefore 
unlocks an array of additional charging options for prosecutors keen 
on imposing such consequences. 
But do prosecutors actually exercise that newfound charging 
option? In this Part, I explain that there are several reasons why a 
prosecutor might choose to file a misdemeanor charge instead of a 
felony charge-that is, why she might engage in strategic under-
charging-when a critical collateral consequence is triggered by a 
misdemeanor conviction. To be clear, I do not claim that prosecutors 
will choose the misdemeanor option in every case. Rather, my claim 
is that we should expect prosecutors to file a misdemeanor charge 
in a significant number of cases and far more often than the con-
ventional wisdom suggests. 91 
The key point is that an offense's collateral consequences, no 
matter how severe, are generally deemed irrelevant for determining 
what procedural safeguards apply. In other words, a misdemeanor 
that threatens a severe collateral consequence is classified the same 
as any other misdemeanor in a jurisdiction's criminal justice sys-
tem. 
Because misdemeanors are less costly and time-consuming to 
prosecute than felonies, filing a misdemeanor furthers prosecutorial 
desires for efficiency.92 In some cases, the likelihood of conviction is 
also increased by filing a misdemeanor, and it is generally no less 
than if a felony were charged.93 Finally, although prosecutors pur-
suing a misdemeanor case must surrender the prospect of additional 
incarceration, the degree of that sacrifice is typically much smaller 
than one might expect and often not enough to offset the substantial 
benefits associated with increased efficiency and a higher likelihood 
of conviction. 94 
91. Cf Meares, supra note 23, at 868-69 (stating that "[o]verchargingis systemic" and that 
prosecutors "may often believe that it is in [their] best interests to charge the defendant with 
the most serious and as many crimes at the outset of the case"). 
92. See infra Part II.B. 
93. See infra Part 11.C. 
94. See infra Part II.D. 
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A. The Choice 
Before examining how prosecutors exercise their charging discre-
tion, it is important to understand who is responsible for the initial 
charging decision and the lasting impact that decision typically has 
on a case. 
One common practice, especially in larger offices, is to designate 
a group of prosecutors as having primary responsibility for screen-
ing incoming cases and making charging decisions. 95 These prosecu-
tors tend to be relatively senior and most of their time is dedicated 
to handling the influx of new cases. 96 After the charging decision is 
made by the screening attorney, the case is then assigned to the 
pertinent line prosecutor. 
Another common practice is for line prosecutors to screen cases 
on a rotating basis and, if charges are filed, continue to prosecute 
many of those same cases.97 For those prosecutors, the process of 
screening cases is one way new matters are added to their case-
load. 98 But those prosecutors do not necessarily keep every case they 
screen, even if charges are filed. Line attorneys who moonlight as 
screeners often handle only felony matters. Therefore, if the new 
matter involves only misdemeanor charges, the case may be assign-
ed to a prosecutor in that office's misdemeanor division. 
95. The screening attorneys studied by Ronald Wright and Marc Miller in their exam-
ination of the New Orleans District Attorney's Office generally fit this mold. See Ronald 
Wright & Marc Miller, The Screening/Bargaining Tradeoff, 55 STAN. L. REV. 29 (2002). A.s 
Wright and Miller detail, the New Orleans District Attorney's Office has a dedicated 
"Screening Section," in which "about fifteen of the eighty-five attorneys in the office" work at 
any given time. See id. at 62-63. In New Orleans, the screening attorney exercises significant 
authority and discretion on behalf of the office: "The screener reviews the investigation file, 
speaks to all the key witnesses and the victims (often by telephone, but sometimes in person), 
and generally gauges the strength of the case." Id. at 63. "For the most serious crimes," 
Wright and Miller report, "the office conducts 'charge conferences' with senior prosecutors 
and police present to discuss the facts and potential charges." Id. at 64. But aside from those 
cases, which typically involve homicide and rape, the screening attorney makes the charging 
decision for the office. Id. at 63-64. 
96. See id. at 63 (noting that all screening attorneys in the New Orleans District 
Attorney's Office "served previously (usually a couple of years) in the Trial Section"). 
97. See id. at 104 n.290 ("In some systems, the same attorney screens and tries (or 
negotiates) the case."); see also Telephone Interview with Individual K, Current Prosecutor 
(July 8, 2015) [hereinafter Interview with K] (describing such a practice in a large Midwestern 
county prosecutor's office). 
98. See Interview with K, supra note 97. 
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Of course, the neat division outlined here oversimplifies matters 
to some degree. Some offices have both groups, whereas others 
follow a different model altogether. The main point is that the 
incentives of the prosecutor making the initial charging decision 
may vary depending on whether she is a dedicated screener or a line 
attorney doubling as a screener. 
Prosecutors enjoy tremendous discretion when deciding what 
criminal charges, if any, to pursue in a given case.99 As one leading 
scholar put it, "[n]o government official in America has as much 
unreviewable power and discretion as the prosecutor."100 The 
Supreme Court has placed few limits on how prosecutors exercise 
their charging discretion, concluding that a prosecutor's "decision to 
prosecute is particularly ill-suited to judicial review."101 
The primary constraint is that the prosecutor must have "proba-
ble cause to believe that the accused committed an offense defined 
by [the applicable] statute."102 Probable cause, however, is not a 
particularly demanding standard. The Court has also imposed two 
other limitations-prohibitions on "selective prosecution"103 and 
"vindictive prosecution"104-but neither is particularly confining. In 
99. See Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607 (1985) ("In our criminal justice system, 
the Government retains 'broad discretion' as to whom to prosecute."). 
100. Stephanos Bibas, Prosecutorial Regulation Versus Prosecutorial Accountability, 157 
U. PA. L. REV. 959, 960 (2009); see also Rachel E. Barkow, Prosecutorial Administration: 
Prosecutor Bias and the Department of Justice, 99 VA. L. REV. 271, 272 (2013) ("[Prosecutors] 
have almost unlimited and unreviewable power to select the charges that will be brought 
against defendants."); Roger A. Fairfax, Jr., Prosecutorial Nullification, 52 B.C. L. REV. 1243, 
1243-44 (2011). 
101. Wayte, 470 U.S. at 607. 
102. Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364 (1978). For an interesting discussion about 
the Supreme Court's "missed opportunity" in Bordenkircher, see William J. Stuntz, The 
Political Constitution of Criminal Justice, 119 HARV. L. REV. 780, 840-42 (2006). 
103. A prosecutor engages in selective prosecution when her decision to prosecute is "de-
liberately based upon an unjustifiable standard such as race, religion, or other arbitrary 
classification." Wayte, 470 U.S. at 608 (citing Bordenkircher, 434 U.S. at 364 (quoting Oyler 
v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 456 (1962))). However, proving such a violation is extremely difficult. 
Selective prosecution claims are judged "according to ordinary equal protection standards," 
which means that the defendant must establish that he was treated differently from others 
and that the prosecutor's decision was "motivated by a discriminatory purpose." Id.; see also 
Pamela Cothran, Prosecutorial Discretion, 82 GEO. L.J. 771, 774 (1994) ("A prosecutor's 
decision to bring charges rarely violates the Equal Protection Clause."). 
104. The Supreme Court has narrowly defined what conduct qualifies as unconstitutionally 
vindictive. In Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 28 (1974), the Supreme Court held that the 
government could not "retaliate" against a defendant for invoking his right to appeal a 
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short, prosecutors are generally free to exercise their charging dis-
cretion, and the "awesome" power such discretion entails, however 
they please.105 
Given today's extensive criminal codes, prosecutors will typically 
have multiple options when choosing how to charge a particular 
course of conduct.106 This Article focuses on a prosecutor's decision 
to file a felony charge or misdemeanor charge. That choice is par-
ticularly important. Among other things, this initial decision has a 
lasting impact: cases usually finish on the same side of the felony-
misdemeanor line as where they began.107 
As Ronald Wright and Rodney Engen detailed in their studies of 
North Carolina felony prosecutions, prosecutors and defense attor-
neys in felony cases "treat the felony-misdemeanor line as a major 
hurdle to cross."108 According to Wright and Engen, only 25 percent 
of cases initially charged as felonies end in a misdemeanor convic-
tion.109 The felony-misdemeanor hurdle is especially high when the 
conviction "by substituting a more serious charge for the original one" upon remand from the 
appellate court. Critically, the Court has carefully distinguished post-appeal retaliation from 
"a pretrial decision to modify the charges against the defendant." United States v. Goodwin, 
457 U.S. 368, 380 (1982). Specifically, the Court has expressly held that "a prosecutor may file 
additional charges [before trial] if an initial expectation that a defendant would plead guilty 
to lesser charges proves unfounded." Id. As a result, vindictive prosecution claims are 
effectively limited to instances of post-trial retaliation. See id. at 381-82. 
105. United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783, 794 (1977). 
106. See Stuntz, supra note 88, at 2549. 
107. See Telephone Interview with Individual A, Former Prosecutor (June 5, 2015) 
[hereinafter Interview with A]. There are likely several reasons for these phenomena. Among 
other things, misdemeanor cases and felony cases are often handled by different sets of 
prosecutors and processed by entirely different trial courts. See infra notes 224-28 and 
accompanying text. In other words, institutional inertia probably plays a role. With respect 
to cases that start as felony prosecutions, prosecutors likely do not make a habit ofreducing 
felony cases to misdemeanors because of concerns related to the setting of plea market prices. 
If felonies were routinely reduced to misdemeanors, then that would become the expectation 
of future defendants charged with felonies (or, more precisely, their attorneys), thereby 
weakening a prosecutor's standard bargaining position. With respect to cases that start as 
misdemeanor prosecutions, increasing the charges to a felony would often require satisfying 
additional procedural requirements-such as approval by a grand jury. In addition, 
misdemeanor prosecutors would probably need to obtain supervisor approval to bump the case 
up to a felony. See Telephone Interview with Individual D, Current Prosecutor (June 8, 2015) 
[hereinafter Interview with DJ. Both considerations likely have a chilling effect on prosecutors 
contemplating turning a misdemeanor charge into a felony one. 
108. Ronald F. Wright & Rodney L. Engen, Charge Movement and Theories of Prosecutors, 
91 MARQ. L. REV. 9, 10 (2007). 
109. Id. at 26-27. 
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jurisdiction's criminal code contains multiple felony grade options 
for the same core offense.110 "In these areas of greatest depth," 
Wright and Engen observed, "the criminal code is structured to 
make prosecutors especially reluctant to cross the felony-misde-
meanor line."m They found that when there were three or more 
felony grade options for an offense, a mere 12 percent of felony cases 
ended with a misdemeanor conviction only. 112 Similarly, cases that 
begin as misdemeanor prosecutions rarely turn into felonies. 113 
B. Efficiency Gains 
The strongest incentive prosecutors have for pursuing a case as 
a misdemeanor rather than a felony is that misdemeanors are typ-
ically much less costly to prosecute.114 Prosecutors and their offices 
have two obvious reasons for wanting to resolve cases as efficiently 
as possible.115 First, efficient resolution "free[s] up prosecutors to 
110. See generally Ronald F. Wright & Rodney L. Engen, The Effects of Depth and Distance 
in a Criminal Code on Charging, Sentencing, and Prosecutor Power, 84 N.C. L. REV. 1935 
(2006). 
111. Wright & Engen, supra note 108, at 27-28. 
112. Id. at 25. 
113. As Issa Kohler-Hausmann documented in her discerning study of New York City, only 
0.2 percent of cases in that jurisdiction that had a top arrest charge of a misdemeanor ended 
in a felony disposition. See Issa Kohler-Hausmann, Managerial Justice and Mass Misde-
meanors, 66 STAN. L. REV. 611, 651 n.108 (2014) (about 450 out of more than 226,000 
dispositions). Kohler-Hausmann's data is keyed off cases in which the top arrest charge was 
a misdemeanor, rather than those in which the top initial charge by the prosecution was a 
misdemeanor. See id. at 630. But there is little reason to think that the latter would 
meaningfully differ from the former. Indeed, several prosecutors I interviewed confirmed it 
was "rare" for a case initially filed as a misdemeanor to finish as a felony. See, e.g., Telephone 
Interview with Individual I, Former Prosecutor (June 5, 2015) [hereinafter Interview with I]; 
Interview with K, supra note 97 (describing a Midwestern urban jurisdiction). 
114. See, e.g., Interview with A, supra note 107 (explaining that felony prosecutions are 
more time-intensive and resource-intensive than misdemeanor cases); Interview with G, 
supra note 55. 
115. Although prosecutors are surely influenced by concerns about efficiency, I do not mean 
to suggest that is their only source of motivation. See supra notes 53-55 and accompanying 
text; infra notes 164-71, 204-07 and accompanying text (identifying conviction rates, potential 
penalties, and public safety as additional factors). Indeed, a definitive and comprehensive 
answer to what prosecutors prioritize has proven elusive. See Stuntz, supra note 88, at 2554 
n.6 ("There is as yet no developed social science literature on what prosecutors maximize, 
probably because the solution is too complex to model effectively."); Wright & Levine, supra 
note 20, at 1067 (''Unfortunately, even though we understand much about what prosecutors 
do, we know remarkably little about why they do it."). The point is simply that efficiency is 
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pursue many more cases," thereby serving the general mission of 
the office. 116 Second, all prosecutors-but especially those managing 
bloated caseloads-have "personal incentives to reduce their work-
loads."117 
It is therefore unsurprising that several prosecutors I interview-
ed118 acknowledged that concerns about resource constraints often 
play an important role in charging decisions. 119 For example, a sen-
sitivity to resource constraints is one reason why screeners in some 
prosecutor's offices are required to seek supervisory approval before 
one of several important considerations. 
116. Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of Trial, 117 HARV. L. REV. 
2463, 2471 (2004). 
117. Id.; see also Bowers, supra note 18, at 1122, 1140-41 (explaining that prosecutors are 
"interested in reducing their own administrative costs" and "avoid[ing) process and work, 
where possible"). 
Notice that if the prosecutor making the initial charging decision is a line attorney moon-
lighting as a screener, she may have additional incentive to charge a borderline case as a 
misdemeanor-and thereby shift future responsibility for the case to a separate prosecutor 
in the office rather than adding another felony case to her own caseload. This is especially 
likely for cases in which the evidence appears to be relatively weak (and therefore less likely 
to plead quickly) or if the case appears to require disproportionate time and attention. See 
Interview with K, supra note 97 (describing such decisions). 
118. I conducted semistructured interviews with eleven current or former prosecutors. See 
generally Avlana Eisenberg, Expressive Enforcement, 61 UCLA L. REV. 858, 881 n.103 (2014) 
(describing semistructured interview technique and citing examples of its use in law review 
literature). In exchange for their candor, I agreed to keep the interviewees' identities confi-
dential and their responses anonymous. The interviews were conducted over the phone, and 
each typically lasted about one hour. 
To be clear, these interviews do not purport to represent a comprehensive qualitative study. 
They nonetheless provide an instructive window into the practices followed by a variety of 
prosecutors' offices. The group of interviewees included prosecutors that had served in federal 
and state court (and sometimes both); collectively, they had worked as prosecutors in twelve 
different offices around the country. Eight of the interviewees were male and three were 
female. Their average tenure as a prosecutor was 6.5 years, with length of service ranging 
from 1 year to 11 years. 
119. When asked what factors prosecutors in their respective offices typically considered 
when deciding what charges to file in a given case, the prosecutors I interviewed repeatedly 
highlighted resource constraints as one of three principal considerations. See, e.g., Telephone 
Interview with Individual F, Current Prosecutor (June 6, 2015) (admitting "surprise" when 
first serving as a prosecutor about ''how much resource constraints and time constraints 
matter" during charging decisions and plea negotiations); see also Interview with A, 
supra note 107; Interview with D, supra note 107; Telephone Interview with Individual E, 
Current Prosecutor (June 5, 2015) [hereinafter Interview with E); Interview with G, supra 
note 55; Interview with K, supra note 97. The other two principal factors cited by the 
prosecutors I interviewed were strength of the evidence and the defendant's criminal history. 
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filing a felony charge, but they are not required to· obtain such 
approval before filing a misdemeanor charge. 120 
Misdemeanors are typically less costly and less time-consuming 
to prosecute because felony defendants possess a unique bundle of 
procedural guarantees.121 Critically, those procedural entitlements 
do· not extend to misdemeanor defendants charged with offenses 
that trigger serious collateral consequences. As a result, prosecutors 
can pursue a severe collateral consequence by filing a misdemeanor 
without triggering the costly procedural safeguards associated with 
felony prosecutions. 
1. Initial Felony Costs: Grand Juries and Preliminary Hearings 
A key difference between felony and misdemeanor cases is the 
costs prosecutors "must shoulder ... immediately" in felony cases, 
but not in misdemeanor ones. 122 "At the outset of felony cases, prose-
cutors typically must present witnesses and evidence to establish 
probable cause to grand juries or to judges at preliminary hear-
ings."123 Prosecutors have no such obligation in misdemeanor cases, 
even when a severe collateral consequence is at stake.124 
120. See, e.g., Interview with D, supra note 107. 
121. See 1 LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 37, § 1.8(c) ("Every jurisdiction provides for some 
procedural differences based upon a distinction between major and minor crimes."); Natapoff, 
supra note 13, at 1315-17. Of course, some criminal procedure entitlements do apply across 
the board, regardless of an offense's relative severity. For example, in all cases the 
government must establish each element of an offense beyond a reasonable doubt. See In re 
Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 361 (1970). And several trial rights, such as those guaranteed by the 
Confrontation Clause, apply to all criminal prosecutions-no matter how minor. See Sanjay 
Chhablani, Disentangling the Sixth Amendment, 11 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 487, 520 (2009). 
122. Bowers, supra note 87, at 1713. 
123. Id. 
124. Id. 
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The federal government125 and eighteen states126 provide criminal 
defendants the right to have felony charges-but only felony charg-
es-initiated by a grand jury. The remaining states provide prose-
cutors the option of initiating felony charges either by filing an 
information or by seeking an indictment from a grand jury. 127 In 
these jurisdictions, prosecutors overwhelmingly prefer the informa-
tion option-indicating that, when given the choice, prosecutors 
tend to avoid the more burdensome grand jury process. 128 In all 
jurisdictions, prosecutors may initiate misdemeanor cases without 
proceeding before a grand jury. 
To be sure, there are many instances when a prosecutor will 
happily-even thankfully-invoke the powers of the grand jury for 
investigatory purposes. But for many more cases, the grand jury 
requirement is just an additional cost of doing felony business. Even 
in jurisdictions where grand juries rarely decline to indict, the grand 
jury requirement still imposes meaningful costs on the prosecutor's 
office, including the costs related to prosecutor time and grand jury 
time. Even if one accepts the familiar adage that a prosecutor could 
get a grand jury to indict a ham sandwich, it is nevertheless the 
125. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 7(a). Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 7 tracks the require-
ments of the Fifth Amendment, which provides that, subject to limited exceptions, "[n]o 
person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a present-
ment or indictment of a Grand Jury.'' U.S. CONST. amend. V. The Supreme Court has long 
interpreted "infamous crime" as one that authorizes an "infamous punishment." See, e.g., Ex 
parte Wilson, 114 U.S. 417, 426 (1885). The Supreme Court has further held that infamous 
punishments include imprisonment in a penitentiary or imprisonment for any period of time 
at hard labor. See United States v. Moreland, 258 U.S. 433 (1922). Because federal law has 
traditionally limited imprisonment in a penitentiary to offenders sentenced to incarceration 
for more than one year, only persons convicted of a felony under federal law could potentially 
be sentenced to a penitentiary. See 4 LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 37, § 15.l(b); see also 18 
u.s.c. § 4083 (2012). 
126. See 4 LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 37, § 15.l(d). Although there is some variance in how 
each state defines the category of offenses requiring indictment by a grand jury, the effective 
rule for those eighteen states and D.C. is that indictments are necessary only for felony 
offenses (that is, those offenses in which potential imprisonment exceeds one year). See id. 
(explaining the various ways in which those jurisdictions have defined the category of offenses 
for which a defendant is entitled to a grand jury). 
127. See id. § 15.l(g). Because the Fifth Amendment's Grand Jury Clause, U.S. CONST. 
amend. V, cl. 1, has not been incorporated against the states through the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, state criminal defendants have no federal constitutional right to a grand jury. See 
Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 537-38 (1884). It is accordingly up to each state whether 
to require a grand jury for certain criminal prosecutions. 
128. See 4 LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 37, § 15.l(g). 
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case that a prosecutor would often prefer to charge that ham sand-
wich by information rather than indictment. And if an office has 
thousands of ham sandwiches to process, the more that can be 
charged by information the better. 
Where felony cases can be initiated by information instead of 
indictment, prosecutors must still bear the cost of a preliminary 
hearing.129 A preliminary hearing is an adversarial proceeding 
conducted by a judicial officer relatively early in the adjudicatory 
process that inquires whether there is probable cause to believe the 
defendant committed the relevant offense.130 The government 
typically needs to establish probable cause in order for the case to 
proceed any further .131 In addition to serving as an initial screening 
mechanism, 132 preliminary hearings often provide valuable informa-
tion about the prosecution's case to the defense team at a relatively 
early stage in the life of a case.133 However, like the right to a grand 
jury, the right to a preliminary hearing is typically reserved only for 
felony defendants. 134 
Critically, no jurisdiction appears to consider an offense's poten-
tial collateral consequences when determining whether a defendant 
has a right to a grand jury or a preliminary hearing. As a result, the 
fact that a misdemeanor may carry a severe collateral consequence 
does not trigger the initial procedural costs associated with felony 
prosecutions. 
129. In those jurisdictions that require felonies to be initiated by a grand jury, or permit 
prosecutors to choose between information and indictment, preliminary hearings are typically 
rendered unnecessary once the grand jury has returned an indictment. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 
5.l(a)(2); 4 LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 37, § 14.2(c)-(d). 
130. 4 LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 37, § 14.l(a). 
131. Id. 
132. See Interview with K, supra note 97 (identifying preliminary hearings as one of the 
reasons felonies are more burdensome to prosecute, in part because they are "one more 
evidentiary hearing'' a prosecutor has to do). 
133. See, e.g., Bibas, supra note 116, at 2494-95 ("[l]n some states, preliminary hearings 
reveal much of the prosecution's evidence to defense lawyers in time for bargaining."). 
134. See William A. Schroeder, Factoring the Seriousness of the Offense into Fourth 
Amendment Equations-Warrantless Entries into Premises: The Legacy of Welsh v. Wisconsin, 
38 KAN. L. REV. 439, 511 n.302 (1990). One exception is Utah, which requires preliminary 
hearings for some misdemeanors as well. See4 LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 37, § 14.2(d), at 307 
n.60. 
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2. Felony Discovery Costs 
Defendants charged with felonies typically receive more ample 
discovery than defendants charged with misdemeanors. 135 This 
usually occurs because of the additional mandatory discovery re-
quirements that the government is typically subject to in felony 
cases and the increased mechanisms that defendants have for devel-
oping discovery in felony cases. 136 As a result, felony prosecutors are 
often forced to endure the additional costs of heightened discovery 
obligations-costs which add up quickly for prosecutors managing 
swollen caseloads. Additional discovery requirements can also re-
duce some of the government's bargaining power during plea 
negotiations, especially if the additional disclosures would force the 
prosecutor to lay bare evidentiary weak spots-yet another reason 
why borderline cases with evidentiary concerns might get routed to 
the misdemeanor track. 
The degree to which jurisdictions afford felony defendants more 
discovery varies. For example, in the federal system most (though 
not all) discovery rules apply equally to defendants facing misde-
meanor charges as those facing felony charges. 137 Many state juris-
dictions, however, create significant disparities in how discovery is 
handled in felony and misdemeanor cases. 
For example, several states that require "open file" discovery do 
so only in cases involving felony offenses. In Arizona, for instance, 
only felony defendants are entitled to receive "[a]ll then existing 
original and supplemental reports prepared by a law enforcement 
agency in connection with the particular crime with which the 
defendant is charged"138 at the outset of the prosecution. Similarly, 
in North Carolina, a pioneering state for open file discovery, only 
135. See Schroeder, supra note 134, at 511 n.300. 
136. See, e.g., 1 LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 37, § 1.S(c) ("Pretrial discovery is also likely to 
be different [for felony and misdemeanor defendants], with such discovery considerably 
narrower as to the misdemeanor defendant. Similarly, pretrial procedures for developing 
evidence (e.g., depositions) and for sharpening the issues at trial (e.g., the bill of particulars 
or pretrial conferences) are likely to be restricted (or simply unavailable) in the process 
applicable to minor offenses.") (footnote omitted); id. § 20.2(c). 
137. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 16. But see FED. R. CRIM. P. 15(c)(3) (making distinctions between 
felony and misdemeanor offenses for purposes of depositions taken outside the United States). 
138. ARIZ. R. CRIM. P. 15.1. 
806 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 57:775 
felony defendants are entitled to the wealth of materials made 
available by such disclosure requirements.139 
Some jurisdictions that do not require open file discovery also 
make significant distinctions between felony and misdemeanor 
offenses. In Georgia, for example, state law provides more expansive 
discovery regarding statements made by the defendant to members 
of law enforcement in felony prosecutions than in misdemeanor 
prosecutions.140 Moreover, Georgia prosecutors in felony cases must 
disclose to the defendant more information regarding potential 
witnesses and witness statements than is required in misdemeanor 
cases.141 
Although many jurisdictions create differing discovery obligations 
for felony and misdemeanor prosecutions, I am not aware of any 
jurisdiction where the discovery rules are altered based on an of-
fense's potential collateral consequences. 
3. Potential Future Costs: Right to a Jury Trial 
A final set of procedural guarantees that varies across offense 
types is a defendant's right to demand a jury trial. According to the 
Supreme Court, the right to a jury trial provides the defendant "an 
inestimable safeguard against the corrupt or overzealous prosecut-
or and against the compliant, biased, or eccentric judge."142 From 
the perspective of the prosecutor, however, a jury trial is often un-
welcome. 
As an initial matter, jury trials take longer to complete than 
bench trials. Jury trials require additional time for jury selection, 
jury instructions, and lengthier opening and closing statements. 
According to one analysis of federal prosecutions, jury trials on 
average took four times longer to complete than bench trials. 143 As 
139. See N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 15A-901, 15A-903 (1973). 
140. Compare GA. CODE ANN.§ 17-16-4 (1994), with GA. CODE ANN.§ 17-16-22. 
141. Compare GA. CODE ANN.§ 17-16-S(a), and GA. CODE ANN.§ 17-16-7, with GA. CODE 
ANN.§§ 17-16-20 to 23. Similarly, only in felony prosecutions must the government disclose 
before trial any "[s]tatements of coconspirators that are attributable to the defendant and 
arguably admissible against the defendant at trial." GA. CODE ANN.§ 17-16-4(a)(2). 
142. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 156 (1968). Blackstone described trial by jury as 
the "grand bulwark" of English liberties. See Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 246 (1999) 
(quoting 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 342-44). 
143. See Uzi Segal & Alex Stein, Ambiguity Aversion and the Criminal Process, 81 NOTRE 
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one former prosecutor I interviewed pithily put it: "[A] two-hour 
bench trial becomes a three-day event with a jury."144 
But the costs associated with the trial itself are only part of the 
equation. Compared to bench trials, jury trials often require prose-
cutors to engage in more intensive preparation and frequently entail 
more pretrial litigation over procedural and evidentiary issues. 145 
For these reasons, offenses that result in a jury trial are substan-
tially more costly to prosecute than those that end with a bench 
trial. 146 
It is no surprise, therefore, that several studies have documented 
prosecutors' preference for bench trials instead of jury trials. For 
example, Issa Kohler-Hausmann observed that the "standard prac-
tice" for misdemeanor prosecutors in New York City was, on the eve 
of trial, to reduce any Class A misdemeanor charges (which trigger 
the right to a jury trial in New York City) to Class B misdemeanor 
charges (which do not) in order "to ensure a bench trial."147 Put 
DAME L. REV. 1495, 1499 n.12 (2006). 
144. Interview with G, supra note 55. 
145. See Segal & Stein, supra note 143, at 1515 (observing that jury trials "involve more 
ancillary litigation over procedural and evidentiary issues than bench trials"); see also 
Interview with G, supra note 55 (explaining that preparation for jury trials is typically more 
extensive than preparation for bench trials). 
146. Of course, it is true that few cases ultimately reach an actual trial-jury or bench. But 
when prosecutors are making initial charging decisions, they do not always know in advance 
which cases will be the ones that go to trial and which ones will be resolved before trial. This 
is particularly true for low-level offenses when the threatened incarceration is rarely exor-
bitant. Furthermore, defendants facing a severe collateral consequence (such as deportation) 
may be especially inclined to litigate instead of pleading guilty because they have relatively 
little to lose. See Interview with D, supra note 107 (observing that defendants in one large 
East Coast jurisdiction typically "won't plead" to an offense that renders a noncitizen 
removable). Thus, prosecutors must charge a case with an eye towards who the ultimate 
adjudicator will be in the event the case does eventually go to trial. See id. (explaining that 
potential "jury appeal" is a factor prosecutors typically consider when making initial charging 
decisions, especially if there is reason to believe that the case might ultimately go to trial). 
147. Kohler-Hausmann, supra note 113, at 659 n.133, 662 n.142; see also M. Chris 
Fabricant, Rethinking Criminal Defense Clinics in "Zero-Tolerance" Policing Regimes, 36 
N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 351, 372 n.106 (2012) (observing the same practice in the 
context of misdemeanor trespass prosecutions). Class A misdemeanors authorize up to one 
year imprisonment, whereas Class B misdemeanors authorize up to only three months 
imprisonment. See N.Y. PENAL LAW§ 70.15(1)-(2) (McKinney 1965). New York courts have 
upheld this practice, primarily on the grounds that "[t]he District Attorney has almost 
unfettered discretion in determining how and when to prosecute, including the right to 
reduce, add or amend charges." People v. Williams, 465 N.Y.S.2d 648, 655-56 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 
1983); see also People v. Urbaez, 886 N.E.2d 142 (N.Y. 2008). 
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simply, "by withholding the jury trial right governments gain a 
major strategic advantage, depriving defendants of the option to 
threaten exercise of the right, with its associated adverse impact on 
dockets and justice system resources."148 
Given prosecutors' preference to avoid jury trials-and the threat 
of jury trials-when feasible, it is important to understand when a 
defendant has a right to a jury trial. Under the Sixth Amendment, 
all felony defendants, but only some misdemeanor defendants, have 
a federal constitutional right to demand a jury trial. A misdemeanor 
defendant charged only with "petty" offenses has no federal consti-
tutional right to a jury trial. 149 The current lodestar for determining 
whether an offense is petty is the potential term of imprisonment it 
authorizes. 150 An offense that threatens more than six months 
imprisonment is always considered serious and automatically trig-
gers a defendant's right to trial by jury.151 Conversely, an offense 
that carries a maximum term of imprisonment of six months or less 
is presumed to be petty. 152 The presumption is rebutted and the 
Such dedication to avoiding a jury trial whenever possible is by no means limited to New 
York. See, e.g., Brandon K. Crase, When Doing Justice Isn't Enough: Reinventing the Guide-
lines for Prosecutorial Discretion, 20 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 4 75, 4 75-77 (2007) (explaining a 
practice in the District of Columbia where prosecutors invariably charge "attempted threats 
rather than threats"-even if the alleged conduct was a completed threat-"because [only] the 
lesser crime of attempted threats does not provide sufficient time of imprisonment to warrant 
a jury trial"). 
148. Wayne A. Logan, Contingent Constitutionalism: State and Local Criminal Laws and 
the Applicability of Federal Constitutional Rights, 51 WM. & MARYL. REV. 143, 158 (2009). 
149. See, e.g., Blanton v. City of N. Las Vegas, 489 U.S. 538, 541 (1989); Baldwin v. New 
York, 399 U.S. 66, 68 (1970). 
150. See Blanton, 489 U.S. at 541-42. The Court previously "focused on the nature of the 
offense and on whether it was triable by a jury at common law." Id. at 541 (citing District of 
Columbia v. Colts, 282 U.S. 63, 73 (1930)); see Callan v. Wilson, 127 U.S. 540, 555-57 (1888). 
See generally Colleen P. Murphy, The Narrowing of the Entitlement to Criminal Jury Trial, 
1997 WIS. L. REV. 133 (tracing the Court's various approaches to the petty offense exception 
over time). According to the Court, it shifted its attention to an offense's potential term of 
imprisonment because that is a "more 'objective indicationO of the seriousness with which 
society regards the offense."' Blanton, 489 U.S. at 541 (quoting Frank v. United States, 395 
U.S. 147, 148 (1969)). 
151. Blanton, 489 U.S. at 542. 
152. See id. at 543. The Supreme Court has also clarified that the critical inquiry is wheth-
er any single offense authorizes a term of imprisonment in excess of six months. In Lewis v. 
United States, the Court held that "no jury trial right exists where a defendant is prosecuted 
for multiple petty offenses," even if "the aggregate prison term authorized for the offenses 
exceeds six months." 518 U.S. 322, 323 (1996). As a result, a prosecutor that carefully engages 
in misdemeanor charge stacking, see infra note 220 and accompanying text, can avoid 
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defendant has a right to a jury trial "ifhe can demonstrate that any 
additional statutory penalties, viewed in conjunction with the 
maximum authorized period of incarceration, are so severe that they 
clearly reflect a legislative determination that the offense in ques-
tion is a 'serious' one."153 Notably, the Supreme Court has thus far 
limited its ''legislative determination" inquiry to the legislature that 
enacted the offense. 154 This is significant because other sover-
eigns-such as the federal government-may impose "additional 
statutory penalties" upon conviction.155 
Whereas a number of states follow the federal constitutional 
baseline when determining the scope of a defendant's right to a jury 
trial, many others exceed the constitutional floor and provide more 
expansive jury trial rights. 156 For example, several states require a 
trial by jury for all offenses that authorize any amount of potential 
imprisonment. 157 And some jurisdictions provide all criminal defend-
ants a right to a jury trial.158 
As for the relevance of an offense's collateral consequences, the 
Supreme Court's reference to "additional statutory penalties" in 
Blanton v. City of North Las Vegas appears to suggest that at least 
some collateral consequences may be pertinent when determining 
whether a defendant has a federal constitutional right to a jury 
trial. 159 However, since Blanton, several significant collateral con-
sequences have been deemed irrelevant by courts when deciding 
whether a presumptively petty offense is, in fact, serious for Sixth 
Amendment purposes. Federal and state courts have repeatedly 
concluded that a requirement to register as a sex offender is im-
triggering a defendant's right to a jury trial. 
153. Blanton, 489 U.S. at 543. In Blanton, the Court predicted that it would be the "rare 
situation where a legislature packs an offense it deems 'serious' with onerous penalties that 
nonetheless 'do not puncture the 6-month incarceration line."' Id. at 543 (citing Brief for 
Petitioners at 16); see also United States v. Nachtigal, 507 U.S. 1, 5 (1993) (repeating the "rare 
case" observation made in Blanton). Notably, the Court made these predictions when 
misdemeanor offenses triggered fewer collateral consequences than is the case today. 
154. Blanton, 489 U.S. at 543-44, 545 n.11. 
155. Id. at 543; see supra note 69. 
156. See Murphy, supra note 150, at 171-73. 
157. See id. at 171-72. 
158. See id. at 171. 
159. See Blanton, 489 U.S. at 543. In Blanton, the Court concluded that an automatic 
ninety-day license suspension imposed for a DUI conviction did not rebut the presumption of 
pettiness. See id. at 543-44. 
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material to the calculus.160 This conclusion has primarily rested on 
the assertion that sex offender registration is not formally a crim-
inal punishment but rather a "remedial, collateral consequence of 
the conviction."161 Similarly, state courts have consistently ignored 
the deportation consequences of a conviction when deciding whether 
an offense is petty or serious.162 And state courts have also held that 
a federal firearm ban-such as the one for persons convicted of a 
misdemeanor domestic violence offense-is irrelevant because it 
was Congress that enacted the firearm prohibition, not the applica-
ble state legislature.163 
In sum, as is the case with grand juries, preliminary hearings, 
and enhanced discovery obligations, prosecutors can often avoid 
160. See, e.g., Thomas v. United States, 942 A.2d 1180, 1186 (D.C. 2008); People v. 
Danthuluri, 923 N.Y.S.2d 814 (App. Div. 2011); People v. Wrighton, 918 N.Y.S.2d 274 (App. 
Div. 2011); People v. Shewbarran, 729 N.Y.S.2d 563 (App. Div. 2001). 
161. Wrighton, 918 N.Y.S.2d at 725. Some courts have also refused to consider a require-
ment to register as a sex offender as relevant when determining whether an offense is petty 
because the jurisdiction imposing that obligation is different from the one prosecuting the 
offense. See, e.g., Ivy v. United States, No. 5:08-CR-00021-TBR, 2010 WL 1257729 (W.D. Ky. 
Mar. 26, 2010); Rauch v. United States, No. 1:07 -CV-0730 WMW, 2007 WL 2900181 (E.D. Cal. 
Sept. 28, 2007). Notably, one state supreme court has held as a matter of state law that being 
required to register as a sex offender does transform a presumptively petty offense into a se-
rious one, thereby entitling the defendant to a trial by jury. See Fushek v. State, 183 P.3d 536, 
543-44 (Ariz. 2008). 
162. See, e.g., Amezcua v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 319 P.3d 602, 605 (Nev. 2014) (hold-
ing that deportation, which "arise[s] out of federal law," is "not relevant" to the jury trial 
inquiry because it does "not reflect a determination by the Nevada Legislature that first-
offense domestic battery is a serious offense"). Notably, in July 2015, a panel of the D.C. Court 
of Appeals concluded that, in light of the Supreme Court's decision in Padilla, a noncitizen 
defendant charged with a presumptively petty offense had a constitutional right to a jury trial 
if a conviction would render the defendant deportable. See Bado v. United States, 120 A.3d 
50 (D.C. 2015). The D.C. Court of Appeals subsequently vacated that decision after granting 
the government's petition for rehearing en bane. See Bado v. United States, 125 A.3d 1119 
(D.C. 2015) (mem.) (per curiam). At the time of publication, the D.C. Court of Appeals had not 
yet issued its en bane decision. 
163. See Amezcua, 319 P.3d at 605. Federal courts have generally considered firearm 
prohibitions, but most have concluded that they are not sufficiently severe to render an of-
fense serious. See, e.g., United States v. Chavez, 204 F.3d 1305, 1314 (11th Cir. 2000) ("We 
hold that the prohibition of firearm possession by persons convicted of a misdemeanor crime 
of domestic violence is not so serious as to entitle them to a jury trial for a presumptively 
petty offense."); United States v. Jardee, No. 4:09-mj-091, 2010 WL 565242 (D.N.D. Feb. 12, 
2010); United States v. Combs, No. 8:05CR271, 2005 WL 3262983 (D. Neb. Dec. 1, 2005). But 
see United States v. Smith, 151 F. Supp. 2d 1316, 1318 (N.D. Okla. 2001) (finding that a 
lifetime ban on firearm possession "is a serious penalty"). 
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triggering a defendant's right to a jury trial by filing a misdemeanor 
charge instead of a felony one. 
C. Increasing (or at Least Not Decreasing) the Likelihood of 
Conviction 
According to many scholars, prosecutors function as conviction 
maximizers. 164 Regardless of whether prosecutors are in fact max-
imizing convictions or something else, 165 there is little doubt that 
concerns about likelihood of conviction are often at the forefront of 
a prosecutor's mind when deciding what charges to pursue in a giv-
en case. 166 In a field where objective metrics for job success are thin, 
a prosecutor's "conviction rate" is often used as "the principal mea-
sure of prosecutorial job performance."167 Thus, prosecutors con-
cerned with career advancement (or even just career stability) are 
likely to place a premium on their win-loss statistics.168 And for 
offices where the chief prosecutor is elected, "the need to maximize 
convictions will be an inescapable environmental constraint."169 As 
Daniel Richman has explained, "[t]hose elections that are contested 
are often fought on an incumbent's win-loss record, and an incum-
bent's concerns in this regard will be felt by his subordinates."17° For 
164. See Bowers, supra note 18, at 1128. For a small sampling of the many scholars who 
assert prosecutors are conviction maximizers, see the sources cited in Bibas, supra note 116, 
at 2471-72 nn.20-23 and Bowers, supra note 18, at 1128 n.45. 
165. See supra note 115. 
166. See Daniel C. Richman, Old Chief v. United States: Stipulating Away Prosecutorial 
Accountability?, 83 VA. L. REV. 939, 967 (1997); see also supra note 119 (recounting that the 
prosecutors I interviewed identified strength of the evidence as one of three principal consid-
erations for initial charging decisions). 
167. Bowers, supra note 87, at 1711; see id. at 1710 n.265; see also Albert W.Alschuler, The 
Prosecutor's Role in Plea Bargaining, 36 U. CHI. L. REV. 50, 106 (1968) ("Conviction statistics 
seem to most prosecutors a tangible measure of their success."); Bowers, supra note 18, at 
1149 ("The conviction rate, after all, is the most visible rubric of quality job performance."). 
168. See Bibas, supra note 116, at 2471 (observing that prosecutors "may further their 
careers by racking up good win-loss records"); Robert L. Rabin, Agency Criminal Referrals in 
the Federal System: An Empirical Study of Prosecutorial Discretion, 24 STAN. L. REV. 1036, 
1045 (1972) ("[C]onvictions are the central performance standard, and departures from the 
average rate raise questions and create anxieties."). As Stephanos Bibas notes, "[f]avorable 
win-loss statistics" can also provide many psychic benefits, including "boost[ing] prosecutors' 
egos, their esteem, [and] their praise by colleagues." Bibas, supra note 116, at 2471. 
169. Richman, supra note 166, at 967. 
170. Id. This is not to suggest that appointed prosecutors care less about win-loss statis-
tics than their elected peers. But the vast majority of chief prosecutors in the United States 
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these reasons, prosecutorial office culture is often described as one 
dominated by the mantra of "nondefeat."171 
In its purest form, concerns about likelihood of conviction are 
trained on the strength of the evidence and whether the prosecutor 
thinks the ultimate adjudicator-a judge or jury-is likely to enter 
a judgment of conviction.172 But concerns about likelihood of convic-
tion can also encompass other considerations, such as the likelihood 
that a particular set of charges will induce a defendant to plead 
guilty. The strength of the evidence (and how that evidence will be 
received by the ultimate adjudicator) still plays a leading role in 
that assessment, but other factors may also be relevant. 173 
In some ways, the strength of the government's case will be 
minimally affected by whether the case is charged as a felony or a 
misdemeanor. For example, the existence of incriminating physical 
evidence, the content and credibility of potential witness testimony, 
and the persuasiveness of certain defenses (such as an alibi) typi-
cally do not turn on the nature of the charge. 
To the extent the strength of the government's case varies, how-
ever, it does so because of a difference in the elements of the offense 
the government seeks to prove. In this respect, misdemeanors are 
almost always easier to prove than felonies. Misdemeanors tend to 
have fewer elements than their felony counterparts.174 Felonies also 
are elected, and the prospect of a future election is a variable unique to those offices. See 
Robert L. Misner, Recasting Prosecutorial Discretion, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 717, 734 
(1996) (observing that over 95 percent of chief prosecutors at the state and local level are 
elected); see also STEVEN W. PERRY, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS [BJS], DOJ, NCJ 213799, 
PROSECUTORS IN STATE COURTS, 2005, at 2 (2006), http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/psc05. 
pelf [https://perma.cc/7H4 7-4GQF] ("Except for Alaska, Connecticut, the District of Columbia, 
and New Jersey, all chief prosecutors in 2005 were elected officials."). 
171. Bowers, supra note 18, at 1128 ("At bottom, prosecutors carry mindsets of 'non-
defeat."'); see also Meares, supra note 23, at 869 ("[A]n abhorrence of losing ... is central to 
prosecutorial culture."); Richman, supra note 166, at 968. For an old but still oft-cited study 
detailing this phenomenon, see Jerome H. Skolnick, Social Control in the Adversary System, 
11 J. CONFLICTRESOL. 52, 57 (1967) ("In the county studied, the prosecutor's office cared less 
about winning than about not losing. The norm is so intrinsic to the rationale of the prose-
cutor's office that one does not often hear it articulated. Nevertheless it is very powerful."). 
1 72. See supra note 119. 
173. See generally Bibas, supra note 116. 
174. For example, under New York law, a person is guilty of criminal possession of a con-
trolled substance in the seventh degree-a misdemeanor-if he ''knowingly and unlawfully 
possesses a controlled substance." N.Y. PENAL LAW§ 220.03 (McKinney 2015). By contrast, 
in order to prove that a person committed criminal possession of a controlled substance in the 
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typically have more demanding injury or harm requirements than 
corresponding misdemeanors. 175 
In addition, felonies sometimes have heightened mens rea re-
quirements in comparison to misdemeanors.176 Beyond simply being 
harder to prove, heightened mens rea requirements can unlock 
additional lines of defense for the defendant, depending on the 
jurisdiction. For example, in most jurisdictions, a defendant charged 
with a specific intent crime may claim that he was too intoxicated 
to form the requisite intent. 177 But that same defendant will likely 
be prohibited from mounting a voluntary intoxication defense, if 
charged with an offense requiring only a general intent.178 Accord-
ingly, if the prosecutor expects that voluntary intoxication may be 
a credible line of defense, then he would have additional reason to 
consider charging a lesser offense that requires only a general in-
tent instead of a higher grade offense that requires specific intent. 
Another reason why a misdemeanor charge may have a higher 
likelihood of conviction (or, equally important for present purposes, 
the perception of a higher likelihood of conviction) in a particular 
fifth degree-a low·grade felony-the government must establish any one of several additional 
elements, such as "intent to sell" the substance or that he possessed at least a certain amount 
of the substance. N.Y. PENAL LAW§ 220.06 (McKinney 2003) (government must prove one of 
eight additional elements). For those scoring at home, New York no longer has an offense 
labeled criminal possession of a controlled substance in the sixth degree. 
175. For example, under District of Columbia law, a person is guilty of felonious assault-
and faces up to three years imprisonment-if he "unlawfully assaults, or threatens another 
in a menacing manner, and intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly causes significant bodily 
injury to another." D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-404(a)(2) (West 2013). "Significant bodily injury" is 
defined as "one that requires hospitalization or immediate medical attention." Id. Mis-
demeanor assault, by contrast, has no significant bodily injury requirement. See id. § 22-
404(a)(l). 
176. For example, under New York law, a person is guilty of assault in the third degree-a 
misdemeanor-if "[w]ith criminal negligence, he causes physical injury to another person 
by means of a deadly weapon or a dangerous instrument." N.Y. PENAL LAW § 120.00(3) 
(McKinney 1965). In order to establish that a person is guilty of assault in the second de-
gree-a lovy-grade felony-the government must instead prove that the defendant committed 
the assault "[w]ith intent to cause physical injury to another person." N.Y. PENAL LAW 
§ 120.05(2) (McKinney 2014). 
177. See Montana v. Egelhoff, 518 U.S. 37, 47-48 (1996) (observing that a majority of 
American jurisdictions permit a voluntary intoxication defense only for specific intent 
crimes); see also State v. Fleck, 810 N.W.2d 303, 307 (Minn. 2012) (explaining that voluntary 
intoxication defense is permissible for specific intent, but not general intent, crimes). 
178. See Fleck, 810 N.W.2d at 307. Some states do not allow a voluntary intoxication 
defense to any offense. See, e.g., Sanchez v. State, 749 N.E.2d 509, 511 (Ind. 2001). But that 
is the minority position. See Egelhoff, 518 U.S. at 48 n.2. 
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case relates to differences between a bench trial and a jury trial. 179 
Generally speaking, a defendant is more likely to be convicted after 
a bench trial than a jury trial.180 Of course, there are exceptions to 
this observation, depending both on the jurisdiction and the offense 
charged. But the best studies to date have concluded that judges are 
more likely to convict than juries.181 Perhaps relatedly, judicial 
officers in most jurisdictions are subject to some form of election.182 
Judges forced to navigate the perilous waters of electoral politics 
may be more inclined to convict than a jury of the defendant's peers, 
none of whom face a future election challenge.183 
In some jurisdictions, including several that encompass the coun-
try's largest urban populations, juries have a well-earned reputation 
for being particularly hostile to certain criminal prosecutions. For 
example, the so-called "Bronx jury'' became famous (or infamous) 
after juries in the Bronx consistently returned acquittals at a rate 
far above the national average. 184 The Bronx is far from alone on 
that score, and there is evidence of significantly higher acquittal 
rates in the District of Columbia, Baltimore, Detroit, and Los 
1 79. As noted earlier, some misdemeanor defendants lack the right to demand a jury trial. 
See supra Part II.B.3. 
180. See infra note 187. 
181. See Adam M. Gershowitz, 12 Unnecessary Men: The Case for Eliminating Jury Trials 
in Drunk Driving Cases, 2011 U. ILL. L. REV. 961, 971-76 (summarizing the "considerable 
empirical and qualitative evidence that judges are more willing to convict than juries"). But 
see Andrew D. Leipold, Why Are Federal Judges So Acquittal Prone?, 83 WASH. U. L.Q. 151 
(2005) (exploring potential reasons why, since the late 1980s, acquittal rates for federal judg-
es outpace the acquittal rates for federal juries). 
182. See Lynn Adelman & Jon Deitrich, Why Habeas Review of State Court Convictions Is 
More Important than Ever, 24 FED. SENT'G REP. 292, 292 (2012) (''Thirty-nine states permit 
voters to elect or retain judges."). In fact, "eighty-seven percent of all state judges stand for 
some form of election." Id. at n.5 (citing Roy A. Schotland, Comment, 61 LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 149, 154 (1998)). 
183. See id. at 292-94 (discussing various examples in which judicial campaigns focused 
on an incumbent's record in criminal cases); see also Scott D. Wiener, Note, Popular Justice: 
State Judicial Elections and Procedural Due Process, 31 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 187, 201 
(1996) ("Crime in general has become more of a high profile issue in political discourse, and 
no politician wants to be classified as 'soft on crime.' Elected judges are no exception.") 
(footnote omitted). See generally Joanna Cohn Weiss, Tough on Crime: How Campaigns for 
State Judiciary Violate Criminal Defendants' Due Process Rights, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1101 
(2006). 
184. See Nancy S. Marder, The Myth of the Nullifying Jury, 93 Nw. U. L. REV. 877, 899-900 
(1999). 
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Angeles-just to name a few .185 This phenomenon has been explain-
ed as the inevitable byproduct of drawing a jury pool from "commu-
nities that harbor such profound and problematic systemic distrust" 
oflaw enforcement. 186 Regardless of the reason, prosecutors in such 
jurisdictions are likely to believe that avoiding the prospect of a jury 
trial will significantly increase the odds of conviction.187 
Even when the defendant has a right to a jury trial, the nature of 
that right often varies depending on whether he has been charged 
with a felony or a misdemeanor. Although nearly every state has 
twelve jurors sit on a felony case, 188 many states have fewer jurors 
serve on misdemeanor cases. 189 For example, in Texas only six jur-
ors sit on a "trial involving a misdemeanor offense."190 And some 
states permit even fewer than six jurors in petty offense cases 
(where the federal constitutional requirement of a six-juror 
minimum does not apply). 191 Smaller juries tend to favor the 
185. See id. at 900 n.114. Prosecutors may also sometimes believe that jurors have skewed 
expectations about the level of evidence necessary to satisfy the beyond a reasonable doubt 
standard. Much has been made of the so-called CSI effect on juries. See generally Tom R. 
Tyler, Viewing CSI and the Threshold of Guilt: Managing Truth and Justice in Reality and 
Fiction, 115 YALE L.J. 1050 (2006). Although there is no evidence confirming that the CSI 
effect is an actual phenomenon, it remains a widely-shared perception among many govern-
ment officials. 
186. Josh Bowers, Grassroots Plea Bargaining, 91 MARQ. L. REV. 85, 110 n.119 (2007). 
187. See Interview with D, supra note 107 (acknowledging that, in a jurisdiction where the 
jury pool is understood to be generally distrustful oflaw enforcement, cases perceived to "not 
play well before a jury" were more likely to be charged as a misdemeanor in order to have a 
bench trial, even if that meant "the charging decision does not always line up with the 
brutality of the crime"). But see Telephone Interview with Individual B, Former Prosecutor 
(June 3, 2015) (stating that juries in a rural East Coast community "were very conservative" 
and thus "the jury pool was never a concern"). 
188. See 6 LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 37, § 22.l(d) ("Only six states authorize juries ofless 
than 12 in felony cases."). 
189. See id. at 19 n.79. 
190. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 33.0l(b) (West 2004). 
191. See, e.g., UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-1-104(d) (West 2008) (four jurors sit on petty 
misdemeanor cases). If a defendant enjoys a federal constitutional right to a jury trial, the 
jury must include at least six persons. See Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223, 245 (1978) (declar-
ing a five-person jury unconstitutional in a nonpetty offense case). 
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prosecution, 192 making this yet another reason a prosecutor may 
prefer charging a misdemeanor instead of a felony. 
Finally, regardless of whether the ultimate adjudicator is a judge 
or a jury, a "rich body of empirical and experimental studies indi-
cates ... that fact finders adjust the burden of proof in accordance 
with the size of the applicable sanction."193 Specifically, studies show 
that "judges and jurors often elevate the probative threshold for 
conviction as the severity of the punishment increases."194 Because 
felonies carry more punishment than misdemeanors, these studies 
suggest that the fact finder will be less likely to convict-even if 
marginally-for the felony than for the misdemeanor. 195 
When it comes to the likelihood of inducing a guilty plea, the rel-
ative strength of a prosecutor's case will have a significant effect on 
the negotiations. Thus, for all the reasons just discussed, a prosecu-
tor's case will often appear stronger when viewed through the lens 
of a misdemeanor. 
But there are other relevant considerations, and those additional 
factors present more of a mixed bag. For example, the threat of 
increased incarceration associated with a felony charge may give 
additional leverage to the prosecutor seeking to induce a guilty plea. 
However, the actual difference in expected prison time can often 
be relatively small, thereby minimizing the effectiveness of that 
threat.196 
192. See Brown v. Louisiana, 447 U.S. 323, 332 (1980) ("[S]tatistical and empirical data 
established that because of a concomitant decrease in the number of hung juries, a reduction 
in the size of the jury panel in criminal cases unfairly disadvantages one side-the defense."); 
see also id. at 332 n.10 (identifying three reasons why smaller juries tend to favor the 
prosecution). 
193. Ehud Guttel & Doron Teichman, Criminal Sanctions in the Defense of the Innocent, 
110 MICH. L. REV. 597, 598 (2012); see id. at 601-07 (surveying studies). 
194. Id. at 598; see also Richman, supra note 166, at 972 n.115 (listing studies conducted 
on this subject). 
195. See Cade, supra note 73, at 1795 ("Studies have suggested that adjudicators convict 
on less evidence where defendants are charged with minor offenses or face less severe crim-
inal sanctions."). Even though a jury is typically not aware of the specific penalties at stake, 
it will likely have a sense of the relative severity of an offense based on its name alone. For 
example, many offenses indicate whether they are a felony or a misdemeanor. And some, such 
as aggravated assault versus simple assault, can clue-in an otherwise unfamiliar jury. 
196. See infra Part 11.D. Vertical overcharging is most potent when the potential "trial 
penalty''-the difference between a post-trial sentence and guilty plea sentence-is especially 
severe. For many low-grade felonies, however, the potential trial penalty will not be exorbi-
tant, since the maximum term of incarceration is typically only a few years. 
2016] CHARGING ON THE MARGIN 817 
In addition, a defendant facing a felony charge can threaten to 
impose more procedural and administrative demands on the 
prosecutor than he could if he were charged with only a misde-
meanor.197 As Josh Bowers has correctly recognized, the defense 
team typically enjoys one significant "advantage over the prosecu-
tor: the defendant has a 'call' on the prosecutor's time."198 Felony 
defendants can almost always "call" more of a prosecutor's time 
than can misdemeanor defendants-meaning the threat to do so is 
more powerful when coming from a felony defendant. 199 And defen-
dants facing one of the severe collateral consequences highlighted 
here, such as deportation or sex offender registration, may be espe-
cially inclined to fight the charges to the bitter end-and therefore 
be perceived at the time of charging as someone more likely to ac-
tually call the prosecutor's time.200 
Potential differences in counsel may also play a role. A felony 
defendant is likely to have better and more experienced counsel, 
plus an attorney with superior resources and opportunities to inves-
tigate, file motions, and actually bargain with the prosecutor.201 By 
contrast, misdemeanor defendants are often lucky to get their law-
yer's individual attention for more than a few minutes. And those 
lawyers are usually so overburdened that independent investigation 
and case analysis are often the exception rather than the rule.202 
In the end, whether a felony or misdemeanor charge is more like-
ly to induce a plea will probably vary from case to case. But more 
often than not, the government's case is likely to be viewed as 
stronger-in terms oflikelihood of conviction at trial-if charged as 
197. See supra Part II.B. 
198. Bowers, supra note 18, at 1151. 
199. As Bowers points out, "[t]he best defense tool in the face of an atypically high price 
then-or even just a price that the defendant does not particularly like-is to create the 
perception that the defendant is willing to engage her own process costs." Id. at 1152. Because 
felony cases have more process costs, felony defendants generally have more procedural chips 
with which to bargain. See id. 
200. See Interview with A, supra note 107 (observing that it was, on average, more difficult 
to secure a plea agreement when the defendant would be facing deportation or sex offender 
registration); Interview with D, supra note 107; Interview with G, supra note 55; see also 
Eagly, supra note 79, at 1195-96 & nn.315-16 (reporting that noncitizen defendants in Harris 
County, Texas charged with deportable offenses appear to be "disproportionately inclined to 
take their cases to trial"). 
201. See infra notes 237, 247 and accompanying text. 
202. See infra notes 239-43 and accompanying text. 
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a misdemeanor rather than a felony. That fact alone means prose-
cutors will not reflexively choose the felony charge, assuming the 
misdemeanor offense also provides an adequate penalty (including 
the pertinent collateral consequence) upon conviction. 
D. The (Minimal) Penalty Sacrifice 
The primary concession prosecutors make when filing a mis-
demeanor instead of a felony is foregoing the additional penalties 
offered by the felony offense-in particular the possibility of 
increased incarceration. Before examining the degree to which 
expected prison time differs between low-grade felonies and misde-
meanors-and therefore how much prison time prosecutors are 
actually surrendering when choosing the misdemeanor offense-it 
is important to appreciate how prosecutors typically approach the 
issue of potential penalties. 
Prosecutors generally have a preferred penalty for each case. I do 
not mean to suggest that prosecutors formally assign each case such 
a value. But prosecutors routinely, even if only implicitly, have a 
rough idea of what a case is "worth"--or, perhaps more precisely, 
what a defendant "deserves"-in terms of appropriate penalties.203 
Critically, a prosecutor's preferred penalty is seldom the most 
severe one she can possibly seek under the law. Put another way, 
prosecutors "rarely operate as sentence maximizers."204 In the words 
of William Stuntz, ''however prosecutors define their preferred sen-
tence, there is no good reason to assume that their preference is 
always for the harshest sentence they can possibly get."205 This is 
because, as Stuntz colorfully put it, "[p]rosecutors are not like civil 
plaintiffs: they are not paid by the conviction, with bonuses for each 
additional month the defendant spends in prison."206 "Once the 
defendant's sentence has reached the level the prosecutor prefers," 
203. See Bowers, supra note 18, at 1146·47; Stuntz, supra note 88, at 2564. 
204. Bowers, supra note 18, at 1128; see also Bibas, supra note 116, at 2471-75. To the 
extent prosecutors ever act as sentence maximizers, it is only for those offenses at the top of 
the severity ladder. See Bowers, supra note 18, at 1153 ("In serious cases, prosecutors drive 
harder bargains and aim for sentence maximization to a greater degree."). But those espe-
cially severe cases fall outside the scope of this Article. 
205. Stuntz, supra note 88, at 2554. 
206. Id. 
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Stuntz observed, "adding more time offers no benefit to the prosecu-
tor."201 
Perhaps the best evidence that prosecutors typically have pre-
ferred penalties that are not the most severe available under the 
law is a series of studies that examined how prosecutors exercise 
their charging discretion when navigating mandatory minimum 
sentences or "three-strike" repeat offender laws. 208 In one such 
study, David Bjerk demonstrated that after the imposition of a 
"three-strike" repeat offender law, "prosecutors [became] almost 
twice as likely to prosecute three-strikes arrestees for lesser 
misdemeanor crimes not covered by the laws."209 Bjerk also con-
cluded that "such behavior [was] the result of prosecutors using 
their discretion to partially circumvent three-strikes laws owing to 
[the prosecutors'] own constraints and preferences, not simply in 
response to changes in behavior by other actors within the judicial 
system."210 In other words, prosecutors altered their charging be-
havior in order to achieve a preferred penalty based on their own 
belief about what each defendant deserved. 
One further point bears mentioning. Recall that for low-level 
offenses, prosecutors will often view the imposition of certain collat-
eral consequences-for example, sex offender registration, firearm 
prohibitions, or deportation-to be as important, if not more impor-
tant, than any term of incarceration.211 For that reason, there are 
likely many cases in which a prosecutor is relatively indifferent to 
the amount of prison time imposed on a defendant, so long as a 
particular collateral consequence is imposed. For example, when a 
prosecutor confronts a low-grade sex offense, the most important 
penalty is likely to be sex offender registration, not the prospect of 
a few additional months in prison.212 
207. Id. 
208. See Michael Tonry, Sentencing in America, 1975-2025, in CRIME AND JUSTICE IN 
AMERICA, 1975-2025, at 141, 166 (Michael Tonry ed., 2013) (summarizing "six major studies"). 
209. David Bjerk, Making the Crime Fit the Penalty: The Role of Prosecutorial Discretion 
Under Mandatory Minimum Sentencing, 48 J.L. & ECON. 591, 593 (2005). 
210. Id. 
211. See supra note 4 and accompanying text. 
212. See, e.g., Interview with E, supra note 119 (explaining that sex offender registration 
was usually treated as nonnegotiable in sex offense prosecutions and recounting cases in 
which she agreed to reduced terms of incarceration in exchange for a guilty plea that included 
sex offender registration); Interview with I, supra note 113 (stating that sex offender registra-
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This also means that an inability to impose a particular collateral 
consequence for a misdemeanor conviction might effectively take 
that charging option off the table. But when the same collateral 
consequence is available for a misdemeanor conviction as for a 
felony conviction, that particular disincentive to pursuing a mis-
demeanor has been removed. 
If the collateral consequence at issue can be imposed for both a 
misdemeanor and a felony conviction, the main penalty difference 
between the two is the length of incarceration. But whereas the 
maximum potential prison terms authorized by each type of offense 
may be years apart, the actual amount of incarceration imposed on 
a defendant for conduct that could feasibly be charged as a misde-
meanor or low-grade felony will often differ much less. 
First, a significant number of felony convictions result in little 
or no actual jail time.213 In 2006 (the most recent year reported by 
the Bureau of Justice Statistics), 31 percent of all state criminal 
defendants convicted of a felony were sentenced to no term of im-
prisonment, and another 28 percent were sentenced only to a local 
jail (which is typically reserved for defendants incarcerated for less 
than one year).214 The average prison sentence in state courts that 
year for all felony defendants was about three years. 215 The average 
prison sentence for defendants convicted of only low-grade felonies 
was likely much less.216 
Second, even if a defendant convicted of a felony was sentenced 
to incarceration for more than one year, it is not necessarily the case 
that the defendant would actually serve that full amount of time 
before being released. Defendants may obtain good time credits 
while in prison, which can reduce the total period of incarceration 
in some jurisdictions by at least one-third.217 
tion "was the most important goal in sex offense cases" and that it was "very rare to give [that 
penalty] up" in exchange for a guilty plea, but that she was generally "willing to give up jail 
time and length of probation"). 
213. See Bowers, supra note 18, at 1145 n.139; Chin, supra note 4, at 153. 
214. SEAN ROSENMERKEL ET AL., BJS, DOJ, NCJ 226846, FELONY SENTENCES IN STATE 
COURTS, 200~TATISTICAL TABLES 2 (rev. ed. 2010), http://www.bjs.gov/contentlpub/pdf/ 
fssc06st. pdf [https://perma.cc/JR6Y-H2VS]. 
215. Id. 
216. See id. 
217. See, e.g., Bowers, supra note 18, at 1145 ("[U]nder New York law, defendants serve 
only two-thirds of their sentenced jail time, calculated from the moment of arrest." (citing N.Y. 
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Third, some studies have indicated that courts with limited or 
specialized jurisdiction-including many misdemeanor courts and 
domestic violence courts-may sentence a borderline felony/misde-
meanor case more harshly than would a general felony court that 
routinely adjudicates more serious offenses. 218 According to scholars, 
the differing responses stem from the courts' differing baselines, as 
the borderline offense may appear relatively serious to a court 
whose typical case is a petty offense, but that same conduct might 
appear relatively mild to a court immersed in higher gravity 
cases.219 
Finally, if prosecutors are keen on seeking more than one year 
of imprisonment, they need not always file a felony charge to 
achieve that goal. Instead, prosecutors can bring multiple misde-
meanor charges-a practice sometimes called "stacking''-and 
request that the prison sentences for each convicted offense be 
served consecutively.220 If successful, the ultimate prison sentence 
could be well in excess of one year. And, critically, the practice of 
stacking misdemeanors does not trigger the bundle of procedural 
guarantees typically afforded defendants charged with a felony. 
In sum, although a low-grade felony prosecution could potentially 
lead to a longer term of incarceration than a misdemeanor prosecu-
tion, the difference in actual incarceration may often be relatively 
small-one that is more likely to be measured in months rather 
than years. 
*** 
PENAL LAW § 70.30(3) (McKinney 1998))). 
218. See Adi Leibovitch, Relative Judgments 29-31 (unpublished manuscript), http://www. 
law. uchicago.edu/files/files/leibovitch_relative_judgments. pdf [https://perma.cdHS5D-VSBA]. 
219. See id. at 30 ("[W]hen recidivist domestic violence offenders in Chicago were charged 
with felonies (at the Criminal Court) instead of misdemeanors [(at the Domestic Violence 
Division)], the felony charges received lower sentences than those that would have been 
ordered for equivalent misdemeanors by the Domestic Violence Division."). 
220. The ultimate effectiveness of such stacking will depend on whether the trial court 
orders that the sentences for multiple convictions run consecutively or concurrently. Most 
states "entrust to judges' unfettered discretion the decision whether sentences for discrete 
offenses shall be served consecutively or concurrently." Oregon v. Ice, 555 U.S. 160, 163-64 
(2009). 
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The upshot of all this is that although prosecutors do forego addi-
tional penalties by pursuing a misdemeanor case, that sacrifice may 
not be as significant as it first appears. As a result, prosecutors 
often have strong incentives to relinquish the possibility of addition-
al incarceration in exchange for the efficiency and likelihood of 
conviction gains that typically accompany misdemeanor prosecu-
tions. And if a prosecutor cares primarily about the imposition of the 
collateral consequence in a given case, the calculation is straightfor-
ward. Indeed, there is no real tradeoff at all. 221 
III. STRATEGIC UNDERCHARGING'S RIPPLE EFFECTS 
At first glance, the choice to file a misdemeanor instead of a 
felony may appear to be relatively insignificant. In a world of guilty 
pleas, one might ask, what difference does it really make? But mis-
demeanor prosecutions and felony prosecutions differ in critical 
ways, including ways that can affect a case's ultimate disposition. 222 
As already detailed, misdemeanor defendants are typically afforded 
fewer procedural protections than felony defendants. The following 
Part examines some of the other ripple effects caused by a prosecu-
tor's decision to engage in strategic undercharging.223 
A. Misdemeanor Courts 
In most states, misdemeanors are adjudicated in different trial 
courts than felonies. 224 While felony dockets have no shortage of 
221. Consider the following experience of a domestic violence prosecutor in a large, Mid-
western jurisdiction. According to this prosecutor, many domestic violence defendants in his 
jurisdiction, especially first-time offenders, are unlikely to receive any term of incarceration 
upon conviction, even when convicted of a felony. At the same time, his office (like many 
others) prioritizes the imposition of firearm prohibitions in domestic violence cases. Because 
the defendant's expected prison "exposure" is often the same for a felony as a misdemeanor, 
the prosecutor acknowledged that he sometimes files a misdemeanor charge because the 
"defendant will get probation regardless," "you still get the gun out of the house," and the 
"process is much quicker." Interview with K, supra note 97. 
222. See generally Natapoff, supra note 13. 
223. The effects highlighted in this Part primarily relate to state, not federal, prosecutions. 
State prosecutions account for about 98 percent of all criminal prosecutions in the United 
States. See 1 LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 37, § 1.2(e). 
224. See NAT'L Ass'N OF CRIMINAL DEF. LAWYERS, MINOR CRIMES, MAsSIVE WASTE: THE 
TERRIBLE TOLL OF AMERICA'S BROKEN MISDEMEANOR COURTS 11 (2009), https://www.nacdl. 
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cases, misdemeanor courts are typically bursting at the seams. 
According to one recent study, state trial courts of limited juris-
diction (those primarily responsible for misdemeanor cases) handled 
more than three times as many cases as state trial courts of general 
jurisdiction (those primarily responsible for felony cases).225 The 
docket disparity is even greater when one focuses on criminal 
cases.226 In Washington, for example, state trial courts of limited 
jurisdiction processed nearly 300,000 criminal cases in 2010, where-
as state trial courts of general jurisdiction processed about 38,500 
criminal cases.227 Other states experience similar disparities. 228 
In 1972, the Supreme Court cautioned that "the volume of mis-
demeanor cases, far greater in number than felony prosecutions, 
may create an obsession for speedy dispositions, regardless of the 
fairness of the result."229 A fixation on clearing dockets is likely even 
more pronounced today, because the number of misdemeanors is 
now double what it was in 1972.230 
org/reports/misdemeanor/ [https://perma.cdG2HJ-HQ9S]; see also Issa Kohler-Hausmann, 
Misdemeanor Justice: Control Without Conviction, 119 AM. J. Soc. 351, 359 n.8 (2013). 
225. See R. LAFOUNTAIN ET AL., NAT'L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, EXAMINING THE WORK OF 
STATE COURTS: AN ANALYSIS OF 2010 STATE COURT CASEWADS 3 (2012), http://www.court 
statistics.org/-/media/Microsites/Files/CSP/DATA%20PDF/CSP _D EC.ashx [https://perma.cc/ 
7KEW-FLUR]. 
226. See id. 
227. Id. at 21. Because courts of limited jurisdiction also process preliminary felony 
matters, some felony cases are "counted twice"--0nce in the court of limited jurisdiction for 
the preliminary matter and again in the court of general jurisdiction for subsequent pro-
ceedings. See id. at 19. 
228. See id. at 21 (courts of limited jurisdiction in Michigan processed 867, 100 criminal 
cases and courts of general jurisdiction processed 63,224 criminal cases). 
229. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 34 (1972) ("An inevitable consequence of [such] 
volume ... is the almost total preoccupation in such a court with the movement of cases." 
(quoting PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON LAW ENF'T & ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME 
IN A FREE SOCIETY 128 (1967))). 
230. In Argersinger, the Court estimated that between four and five million cases involved 
misdemeanors. 407 U.S. at 34 n.4. Today, the best estimates place that number northward 
of ten million. See Natapoff, supra note 13, at 1320-21. Much (though not all) of the increase 
is likely attributable to widespread adoption of a policing strategy called "order maintenance" 
policing or the "broken windows" theory. See Kohler-Hausmann, supra note 113, at 632-33, 
639. 
For a small but representative sampling of the extensive literature on order maintenance 
policing and the broken windows theory, see WILLIAM BRATTON & PETER KNOBLER, TURN-
AROUND: How AMERICA'S TOP COP REVERSED THE CRIME EPIDEMIC 152 (1998); BERNARD E. 
HARCOURT, ILLUSION OF ORDER: THE FALSE PROMISE OF BROKEN WINDOWS POLICING 1-4 
(2001); Bernard E. Harcourt & Jens Ludwig, Broken Windows: New Evidence from New York 
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Given the pressures to process cases rapidly,231 misdemeanor 
judges must limit the amount of time they spend on any particular 
matter. 232 This means they have less time for holding in-person 
hearings and instead decide more issues on the papers alone. This 
also means they have less time for engaging defendants in searching 
plea colloquies, which are supposed to be the final backstop for 
ensuring that there is a factual basis for the plea and a knowing and 
voluntary waiver of various constitutional rights.233 
Misdemeanor courts, moreover, usually operate with their own 
pool of judges. As Eve Brensike Primus has detailed, "[s]tate mis-
demeanor judges often have smaller salaries and occupy positions 
of less prestige than their felony counterparts. As a result, more 
qualified applicants are naturally attracted to the felony courts."234 
Further, "[i]n a number of states, such as Arizona, Missouri, New 
York, and Pennsylvania, some of the judges in these [misdemeanor] 
courts are not lawyers."235 Perhaps unsurprisingly, the average dif-
ference between misdemeanor judges and felony judges-''both in 
terms of the judges' knowledge of the law and their receptivity to 
legal arguments"-has been described by some as "astounding."236 
City and a Five-City Social Experiment, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 271 (2006); George L. Kelling & 
James Q. Wilson, Broken Windows: The Police and Neighborhood Safety, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, 
Mar. 1982, http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/1982/03/broken-windows/304465/ 
[https://perma.cc/8K37-EMHR] (introducing the broken windows theory). 
231. Among other things, docket clearance rate is a common component of judicial per-
formance evaluations. For example, the National Center for State Courts has developed ten 
criteria to measure court performance, and three of those criteria rate a judge's ability to ef-
fectively manage her docket. See NAT'L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, TRIAL COURT PERFORMANCE 
MEASURES (2005), http://www.courtools.org/Trial-Court-Performance-Measures.aspx [https:// 
perma.cc/PXQ6-9ZG3]. 
232. See generally Alexandra Natapoff, Aggregation and Urban Misdemeanors, 40 FORD-
HAM URB. L.J. 1043 (2013). 
233. See id. at 1071-72. As Natapoff notes, some courts have even taken to doing pleas en 
masse. See id. at 1072-73 (detailing practice in one Arizona court where judges routinely 
presided over fifty-to-seventy defendants pleading guilty at once). 
234. Eve Brensike Primus, Our Broken Misdemeanor Justice System: Its Problems and 
Some Potential Solutions, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. POSTSCRIPT 80, 81 (2013). 
235. See NAT'LAsS'NOF CRIMINAL DEF.LAWYERS, supra note 224, at 11. 
236. Primus, supra note 234, at 81. Moreover, because "felony convictions get appealed at 
much higher rates than do misdemeanor convictions ... misdemeanor judges are relatively 
insulated from higher court feedback and do not learn of their mistakes in the same way that 
felony trial court judges do." Id. 
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B. Misdemeanor Defense Counsel 
Another key consequence of strategic undercharging relates to 
the defense counsel that misdemeanor defendants receive. Misde-
meanor defense attorneys are typically less experienced than felony 
defense attorneys. 237 Among other things, this means they have had 
comparatively less time to establish credibility with local prosecu-
tors-a trait that is often critical to counsel's ability to plea bargain 
effectively. 238 
In addition, defense attorneys handling misdemeanors typically 
carry greater caseloads than their felony colleagues.239 The most 
widely recognized caseload guidelines provide that defense attor-
neys should not exceed four hundred misdemeanor cases an-
nually.240 Many defense attorneys, however, go far past that 
recommended limit.241 One recent study found that public defenders 
in Chicago, Atlanta, and Miami average more than two thousand 
misdemeanor cases per year. 242 That same study reported similar 
excesses in a variety of other jurisdictions. 243 
The defense attorneys managing these caseloads are usually 
public defenders compensated by a fixed salary or court-appointed 
237. Cade, supra note 73, at 1787 ("[M]isdemeanor defenders typically have little expe-
rience."). 
238. See Bibas, supra note 116, at 2534. Depending on the greenness of the attorney, it may 
also mean that counsel is not yet aware of the various collateral consequences that may attach 
upon conviction. For now at least, the Supreme Court has limited the Sixth Amendment right 
that it recognized in Padilla-"that counsel must inform her client whether his plea carries 
a risk of deportation"-to the penalty of deportation. Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 374 
(2010). Accordingly, defense counsel's failure to advise her client of other potential collateral 
consequences of conviction is not a ground for a later ineffective assistance claim. 
239. See Erica J. Hashimoto, The Price of Misdemeanor Representation, 49 WM. & MARYL. 
REV. 461, 4 70-71 (2007); Roberts, supra note 44, at 294. Of course, stifling defense caseloads 
are not unique to misdemeanor attorneys. See Darryl K. Brown, Rationing Criminal Defense 
Entitlements: An Argument from Institutional Design, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 801, 812 (2004); 
Roberts, Ignorance, supra note 26, at 146-4 7 (describing "crushing caseload conditions" facing 
defense attorneys). That said, "individuals facing misdemeanor charges are more likely to 
suffer the consequences of the workload strain." Roberts, supra note 44, at 294. 
240. See Hashimoto, supra note 239, at 487 n.122, 504 n.180; Roberts, supra note 44, at 
295. 
241. See, e.g., Natapoff, supra note 13, at 1342-43; NAT'L Ass'N OF CRIMINAL DEF. LAW-
YERS, supra note 224, at 21. 
242. NAT'LAsS'N OF CRIMINAL DEF. LAWYERS, supra note 224, at 21. 
243. See id. at 20-22. 
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attorneys operating under strictly-limited fee caps.244 For the latter, 
the fees are typically capped at a fraction of the funding allotted for 
felony cases.245 In Illinois, for example, payment to court-appointed 
counsel "may not exceed $500 for a defendant charged with a mis-
demeanor," yet payment "may not exceed ... $5,000 for a defendant 
charged with a felony."246 The combination of a demanding caseload 
with either a fixed salary or depressed fee caps can have deleterious 
effects on an attorney's ability and incentive to perform the costly 
work of investigating potential defenses, filing motions, negotiating 
with the prosecutor, or personally meeting with the defendant to 
discuss any number of pertinent issues (including potential con-
sequences of conviction).247 
This is particularly significant given that misdemeanor attorneys 
typically receive much less "free" (or low-cost) discovery than their 
felony counterparts.248 As a result, misdemeanor defense counsel 
must rely even more on the fruits of their own investigation in order 
to assess the strength of the government's case. But, for the reasons 
noted, 249 misdemeanor defense attorneys will often be the ones least 
able to perform that critical task. 
Some misdemeanor defendants lack access to counsel altogeth-
er.250 An indigent defendant charged with a misdemeanor has a 
constitutional right to government-provided counsel only if he is 
244. Most misdemeanor defendants are indigent. See Mary Sue Backus & Paul Marcus, 
The Right to Counsel in Criminal Cases, A National Crisis, 57 HAsTINGS L.J. 1031, 1034 
(2006) ("Poor people account for more than 80% of individuals prosecuted."). 
245. Roberts, supra note 44, at 326-27, 327 n.214. Court-appointed attorneys are typically 
paid on a per case basis. Cade, supra note 73, at 1788. 
246. See 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/113-3.l(b) (1994). Curiously, the same sti,i.tuteprovides that 
court-appointed counsel may receive up to "$2,500 for a defendant who is appealing a con-
viction of any class offense." Id. In other words, counsel is entitled to five times as much 
funding for appealing a misdemeanor conviction as he is for trying to avoid that conviction in 
the first place. 
247. See Roberts, supra note 44, at 317-18 (''Misdemeanor attorneys across the country 
handle caseloads that make almost any investigation difficult."); Bibas, supra note 116, at 
2479-80. 
248. See supra notes 137-41 and accompanying text. 
249. See supra notes 237-47 and accompanying text. 
250. There also is "compelling evidence that indigent defendants, petty offenders in par-
ticular, often do not get counsel even when they are legally entitled to it." Natapoff, supra note 
13, at 1340-43 (collecting and summarizing various studies showing lack of access to counsel 
for indigent petty offenders). 
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actually "sentenced to a term of imprisonment."251 Nearly half of the 
states have exceeded that federal floor and provide counsel to an 
indigent defendant if he is charged with a misdemeanor that merely 
authorizes incarceration.252 But a significant number of states still 
limit the right to counsel for at least some misdemeanor offenses 
to those instances in which imprisonment is actually imposed. 253 
As with other constitutional safeguards, an offense's potential col-
lateral consequences are generally considered irrelevant when 
determining whether the defendant has a right to counsel.254 
C. Misdemeanor Prosecutors 
Strategic undercharging can also affect which line prosecutor is 
responsible for handling the case.255 This choice is important be-
cause misdemeanor prosecutors can differ in meaningful ways from 
felony prosecutors. Misdemeanor prosecutors are frequently the 
most junior and least experienced attorneys in the office. 256 Given 
their lack of seniority, misdemeanor prosecutors often need 
supervisory approval for any number of case-altering decisions.257 
251. Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 374 (1979). In Alabama v. Shelton, 535 U.S. 654, 662 
(2002), the Supreme Court clarified that a suspended prison sentence also may not be imposed 
on a misdemeanor defendant unless he was represented by counsel. An indigent defendant 
charged with a felony, however, has an absolute right to government-provided counsel. See 
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). This is true regardless of whether any prison time 
is actually imposed on the defendant. See Nichols v. United States, 511 U.S. 738, 743 n.9 
(1994). 
252. See 3 LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 37, § ll.2(a). 
253. See id. at 619 n.30; see also Shelton, 535 U.S. at 669 n.8. 
254. As a matter of federal constitutional law, courts have uniformly concluded that an 
offense's potential collateral consequences have no bearing on whether an indigent defendant 
is entitled to counsel. See Clapman, supra note 26, at 603. As a matter of state law, a handful 
of jurisdictions have indicated that an offense's collateral consequences may be relevant to 
defining the scope of the right. See 3 LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 37, § 11.2(a), at 620 n.34. But 
those jurisdictions are few in number and, generally speaking, appear to consider an offense's 
collateral consequences as merely one factor among many when deciding whether the right 
to state-provided counsel applies in a given case. 
255. This is particularly true in large prosecutor's offices that have dedicated misdemeanor 
units. See supra notes 95-98 and accompanying text. 
256. See Lee, supra note 73, at 596. 
257. Bowers, supra note 18, at 1128 ("[L]ine prosecutors often must obtain supervisory 
approval before dismissing cases."); Cade, supra note 73, at 1783 ("New prosecutors, cutting 
their teeth on misdemeanor cases, may need permission from supervisors to deviate signi-
ficantly from the original charge."). 
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Unsurprisingly, junior prosecutors tend to be the "most deferential 
to supervisory authority and are therefore least likely to buck 
[office] policy."258 As a result, misdemeanor prosecutors may be less 
likely to second-guess the initial charging decisions that were made 
by more senior prosecutors in the office.259 
Misdemeanor prosecutors also tend to carry caseloads that far 
outpace their felony colleagues.26° For example, one leading study 
reports that misdemeanor prosecutors in many of the country's most 
populous districts are responsible for hundreds of cases at any given 
time.261 For example, "[i]n Tarrant County, Texas, home of Fort 
Worth, ... misdemeanor prosecutors juggle between 1200 and 1500 
matters apiece."262 
Given such caseloads, a prosecutor's capacity to scrutinize the 
merits of a particular case will typically be quite limited. As one 
prosecutor I interviewed put it: "The amount of attention you can 
give to a misdemeanor is a fraction of the attention you can give a 
felony. There is rarely an opportunity to reevaluate the case after 
the initial charging decision and determine whether different char-
ges are more appropriate."263 This reality is particularly significant 
since cases charged as misdemeanors are not subjected to an 
independent, initial screening mechanism, such as a grand jury or 
a preliminary hearing. 264 
Finally, new prosecutors tend to be "systematically harsher" than 
their more senior colleagues. 265 Among other things, this means they 
258. Bowers, supra note 87, at 1704. 
259. See supra notes 95·98 and accompanying text. 
260. See Adam M. Gershowitz & Laura R. Killinger, The State (Never) Rests: How Excessive 
Prosecutorial Caseloads Harm Criminal Defendants, 105 NW. U. L. REV. 261, 268-70 tbl.l 
(2011). 
261. See id. (giving examples from most of the country's largest cities, including Los 
Angeles, Chicago, Manhattan, Brooklyn, Miami, Philadelphia, and Dallas); see also Kohler-
Hausmann, supra note 113, at 664 n.150 (observing that, in New York City, Assistant District 
Attorneys often carry upwards of two hundred open misdemeanor cases at any given time). 
262. Gershowitz & Killinger, supra note 260, at 272. For a synopsis of potential harms 
caused by excessive prosecutorial caseloads generally, see id. at 279-96. 
263. Interview with K, supra note 97. 
264. See supra Part 11.B.1; see also Interview with K, supra note 97 ("[M]isdemeanors are 
unloved from the beginning."). 
265. Bibas, supra note 116, at 2475; see also Alafair S. Burke, Prosecutorial Passion, 
Cognitive Bias, and Plea Bargaining, 91 MARQ. L. REV. 183, 190 (2007) (quoting one former 
prosecutor: "As a baby DA, I thought all criminals needed to be punished to the fullest extent 
of the law."). 
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are less likely to bargain away potential penalties on equitable 
grounds alone. 266 "[I]nexperienced prosecutors" are also more likely 
to "press for overly broad categories in their sentencing recommen-
dations, when more individualized judgments could produce more 
proportional and economical sentencing."267 
IV. TAKING SERIOUS MISDEMEANORS SERIOUSLY 
In many respects, misdemeanors and felonies are processed in 
two different worlds: different judges, different attorneys, different 
docket pressures, and different procedures. This Part focuses on 
that last difference-the procedural disparity between misdemean-
ors and felonies. 268 For reasons explained earlier, that disparity is 
an integral component of strategic undercharging. 
The procedural gap between misdemeanors and felonies has long 
rested on two grounds: (1) heightened procedures are warranted 
only for offenses of a sufficient severity,269 and (2) the sole metric for 
determining an offense's relative severity is the potential term of 
imprisonment it authorizes. 270 This Part challenges the continued 
wisdom of the second ground and claims that collateral conse-
quences should also be considered when determining an offense's 
relative severity. Under that approach, misdemeanor offenses car-
rying certain collateral consequences would trigger the same bundle 
266. As Ronald Wright and Kay Levine document in their recent study about the effect that 
experience has on prosecutors over time, "[e]ntry-level and junior prosecutors were more 
likely than their experienced colleagues to say that it is important to stick with the most 
serious charges during plea negotiations." Wright & Levine, supra note 20, at 1087-88. 
267. Id. at 1069. 
268. Even when the procedural safeguards afforded to misdemeanor defendants are similar 
to those provided felony defendants, the misdemeanor version usually comes in a watered-
down form. For example, while most misdemeanor defendants have a right to government-
provided counsel, the amount of funding provided to that counsel will pale in comparison to 
what an attorney would receive if the case were a felony. See supra notes 244-46. Similarly, 
a misdemeanor defendant afforded the right to demand a jury trial will typically be entitled 
only to a jury of a smaller size than a felony defendant (for example, six jurors instead of 
twelve). See supra notes 188-91 and accompanying text. 
269. As Alexandra Natapoff summarized this state of affairs, "[i]f the United States 
Supreme Court can be said to have a misdemeanor theory, it is that lesser punishments 
should trigger reduced procedural entitlements." Natapoff, supra note 13, at 1350. 
270. See supra notes 150-52 and accompanying text. The lone exception is the consti-
tutional right to counsel, which uses both a potential imprisonment and actual imprisonment 
metric for purposes of determining relative severity. See supra notes 251-53. 
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of entitlements typically afforded felony defendants. This would 
better honor an important principle underlying the criminal justice 
system: serious sanctions require serious procedures. 
A. Reconsidering Relative Severity 
Although potential imprisonment remains a useful proxy for of-
fense severity, the misdemeanor-felony line should no longer serve 
as the sole litmus test. 271 Instead, an offense's potential collateral 
consequences should also be factored into the calculus. 
The current prison-centric benchmarks for determining relative 
severity were designed at a time when the overwhelming majority 
of collateral consequences-and especially those generally consid-
ered most severe-were limited to felonyconvictions. 272 As explained 
earlier, that is no longer the case.273 Now that many important 
collateral consequences are triggered by misdemeanors, defining 
severity solely in terms of potential prison time fails to capture the 
full picture of an offense's potential sanctions and therefore fails to 
capture the full picture of an offense's relative severity.274 
This is true regardless of whether one views severity from the per-
spective of the legislature that enacted the offense or the defendant 
charged with the offense. Consider the following (and fairly com-
mon) example. A jurisdiction creates an offense for misdemeanor 
sexual abuse and caps potential imprisonment at twelve months or 
less. In addition, the legislature requires a lengthy period of sex 
offender registration upon conviction.275 It would be mistaken to 
conclude that the legislature did not view misdemeanor sexual 
271. For a thoughtful and thought-provoking take on the difficulties of drawing lines when 
it comes to the issue of relative crime severity, see generally Eugene Volokh, Crime Severity 
and Constitutional Line-Drawing, 90 VA. L. REV. 1957 (2004). 
272. See supra notes 40-42 and accompanying text. 
273. See supra notes 43-44 and accompanying text. 
27 4. When collateral consequences were effectively limited to felony offenses, little was lost 
when severity was understood exclusively as a function of potential prison time. This is be-
cause a conclusion about an offense's severity would have been the same regardless of 
whether collateral consequences were considered (since those consequences were confined to 
offenses already considered serious). 
275. See supra notes 60-64 and accompanying text. In some jurisdictions, like New York, 
a defendant convicted of certain misdemeanor sex offenses faces a maximum of only three 
months in jail but will be required to register as a sex offender for a minimum of fifteen years. 
See supra note 64. 
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abuse as a serious offense simply because it declined to authorize a 
higher potential term of imprisonment.276 Rather, the legislature 
employed an alternative and additional penalty in the form of sex 
offender registration. 277 
The same can be said when viewing matters from the perspective 
of the defendant. It is far from clear, for example, whether a typical 
defendant would consider a modest amount of additional prison 
time to be a more or a less severe penalty than being required to 
register as a sex offender for over a decade. Indeed, there is evi-
dence that at least some defendants are willing to risk additional 
time in prison in the hopes of avoiding a severe collateral conse-
quence that a misdemeanor conviction now triggers.278 
Accounting for an offense's potential collateral consequences 
would reflect the increasingly central role such consequences 
currently play in our criminal justice system. The collateral con-
sequences imposed on a defendant are often the most significant 
penalties that result from a criminal conviction. 279 The procedures 
aimed at ensuring accurate and fair criminal adjudications should, 
simply put, reflect this new norm. 
276. See Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466U.S. 740, 762-63 (1984) (White, J., dissenting) ("Although 
the seriousness of the prescribed (penal] sanctions is a valuable objective indication of the 
general normative judgment of the seriousness of the offense, other evidence"-such as an 
offense's collateral consequences-"is available and should not be ignored'') (citation omitted); 
Schroeder, supra note 134, at 516 ("[A]ny collateral consequence to an offender that might 
result from a conviction for a particular offense is arguably relevant in assessing the seri-
ousness of the offense."). 
277. At first blush, a legislature's decision to simultaneously impose a lengthy period of sex 
offender registration for a conviction and yet cap potential imprisonment at twelve, six, or 
even three months might make little sense. If the offense warrants a lengthy period of sex 
offender registration, why would it not also warrant at least the possibility of substantial jail 
time? The most likely answer is that legislatures wanted to expand a prosecutor's menu of 
charging options, thereby making it easier for prosecutors to successfully impose sex offender 
registration requirements on more offenders. The menu analogy is, of course, from Professor 
Stuntz. See Stuntz, supra note 88, at 2549. 
278. See, e.g., Kaiser v. State, 641 N.W.2d 900, 901-02 (Minn. 2002) (ruling on a defendant 
seeking to withdraw guilty plea to misdemeanor sex offense on the grounds that counsel failed 
to inform him of sex offender registration requirement); see also, e.g., Sames v. State, 805 
N.W.2d 565, 566 (Minn. Ct. App. 2011) (describing a defendant seeking to withdraw guilty 
plea to misdemeanor domestic assault on the grounds that counsel failed to inform him of 
firearm prohibition); State v. Ortiz, 44 A.3d 425, 426-27 (N.H. 2012) (defendant seeking to 
withdraw guilty plea to misdemeanor shoplifting on the grounds that court failed to inform 
her of deportation consequences). 
279. See supra notes 4-10 and accompanying text. 
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One potential objection to considering collateral consequences 
when determining relative severity is that it would create difficult 
line-drawing problems about which consequences should be taken 
into account and which ones should qualify as sufficiently severe. 
If nothing else, the misdemeanor-felony line provides a clear point 
of demarcation. Injecting collateral consequences into the mix 
would-even if only temporarily-muddy that clean dividing line.280 
Among other things, courts and legislatures tasked with determin-
ing relative severity would have to resolve at least three questions 
when setting the parameters for the universe of relevant collateral 
consequences. 281 
The first is whether to consider collateral consequences beyond 
those imposed by the prosecuting jurisdiction. If a conviction in 
state court also would trigger federal collateral consequences, 
should those federal consequences be factored in the severity an-
alysis? The answer to this question likely depends on how one 
resolves a more fundamental issue about relative offense severity: 
should relative severity be viewed from the perspective of the de-
fendant or from the perspective of the prosecuting jurisdiction (that 
is, its legislature)? If the former, then collateral consequences im-
posed by other sovereigns should be relevant to the severity 
analysis. If the latter, then the possibility of another jurisdiction's 
collateral consequences being imposed on the defendant is largely 
irrelevant, as it fails to reflect the views of the prosecuting jurisdic-
tion. 282 
The second question is whether to consider collateral conse-
quences that are not uniformly applied across all defendants. Some 
collateral consequences, including firearm prohibitions and sex 
offender registration, apply to all defendants convicted of a trigger-
280. This concern echoes one aspect of the familiar debate involving rules versus stan-
dards. See generally Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE 
L.J. 557 (1992). 
281. I assume for present purposes that courts and legislatures would consider only those 
consequences imposed by law-that is, those consequences that arise by some form of state 
action, not private conduct. See supra note 27 (discussing the distinction between 
consequences imposed by law and those by private action). 
282. This has been the approach adopted by the Supreme Court in the context of a con-
stitutional right to a jury trial: only those "additional statutory penalties" adopted by the 
legislature that enacted the offense are relevant. See Blanton v. City of N. Las Vegas, 489 
U.S. 538, 543-44, 545 n.11 (1989). 
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ing offense, but some other consequences do not. Consider a federal 
misdemeanor drug offense where a conviction would render a non-
citizen deportable. The sanction of deportation applies only to 
noncitizen defendants. Should the possibility of deportation be 
considered relevant for purposes of relative offense severity, even 
though that consequence would threaten only some defendants 
charged with the pertinent offense? As with the previous question, 
the answer likely depends on whether relative severity should be 
viewed from the perspective of the defendant or that of the prose-
cuting jurisdiction. 
The third question is whether to consider collateral consequences 
that afford the pertinent decision maker some degree of discretion 
about imposing them or to limit consideration to those consequences 
imposed automatically upon conviction.283 Under the current ap-
proach, relative severity is determined by looking at potential 
imprisonment and not the actual amount of incarceration imposed. 
Courts and legislatures would therefore need to decide whether 
discretionary consequences are similar to potential incarceration 
such that they merit consideration-even though the penalty may 
not ultimately materialize. 
The existence of such open questions should not obscure the fact 
that a number of important collateral consequences would be rele-
vant even under the most restrictive approach: consequences that 
are automatically imposed by the prosecuting jurisdiction on all 
defendants convicted of the pertinent offense. That standard alone 
would encompass, among other things, sex offender registration and 
many firearm prohibitions. 
After determining the universe of relevant collateral conse-
quences, courts and legislatures would also need to decide what 
consequences qualify as sufficiently severe to trigger the relevant 
felony procedure. This could be done either by identifying the 
specific consequences that merit heightened procedures, or on a 
283. See supra note 33 (discussing distinction between collateral sanctions and discre-
tionary disqualifications). For an interesting discussion about the American Law Institute's 
recent proposal to "fully integrate" collateral consequences into a trial court's sentencing 
process, including by permitting trial judges to "grant relieffrom specific mandatory collateral 
consequences at and after sentencing," see Margaret Colgate Love, Managing Collateral 
Consequences in the Sentencing Process: The Revised Sentencing Articles of the Model Penal 
Code, 2015 WIS. L. REV. 247, 263-73. 
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case-by-case basis using a standard akin to the one employed by the 
Supreme Court in the jury trial context-that is, whether the 
additional "penalties, viewed in conjunction with the maximum 
authorized period of incarceration, are so severe" to warrant clas-
sifying the offense as a "'serious' one."284 
It is important to emphasize here that some procedural safe-
guards are required by the Constitution and others are governed 
exclusively by statute or court rule. How and where to draw the line 
may vary depending on the right at issue, including whether the 
inquiry is geared toward establishing a constitutional floor or 
instead about achieving optimal criminal justice policy. 
I will not attempt here to catalogue which collateral consequences 
should trigger which procedural entitlements. For now, my sole aim 
is to establish that relative severity-and, by extension, the pro-
cedural protections afforded a criminal defendant-should no longer 
turn exclusively on the maximum term of incarceration authorized 
by the pertinent offense. The next Section explains why there is 
potentially much to be gained by including collateral consequences 
in the relative severity calculus. 
B. Implications 
Applying felony-level procedures to misdemeanors carrying se-
vere collateral consequences could have several salutary effects on 
the administration of low-level offenses.285 To begin, bolstering 
available procedural protections would likely increase the intensity 
of initial case screening by prosecutors, and in particular, encourage 
284. Blanton, 489 U.S. at 543; see also N.J. STAT. ANN.§ 2B:24-l (West 1998) (New Jersey 
statute authorizing counsel for indigent defendants "subjected to a conviction entailing 
imprisonment in fact or other consequence of magnitude" (quoting Rodriguez v. Rosenblatt, 
58 N.J. 281, 295 (1971)) (emphasis added)). 
285. Because my focus here is on the relationship between the current regime of collateral 
consequences and adjudicatory procedures, I do not discuss other potential reforms that also 
merit serious consideration. For example, I am putting to the side arguments that legislatures 
should cease attaching significant collateral consequences to misdemeanors or should at least 
make them comparatively less severe (for example, creating a rule that misdemeanants are 
ineligible to possess a firearm for five or ten years rather than for life). Similarly, reforms to 
the method of assignment for misdemeanor cases triggering severe collateral consequences 
in prosecutors' offices or to defense attorneys also deserve more attention than I can give them 
here. 
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additional consideration about whether to charge an offense that 
carries a severe collateral consequence, to pursue a different charge 
that does not, or even to refuse filing charges at all. 286 Extra at-
tention given at the screening stage would be a most welcome 
development in the low-level offense arena, which is more often 
known for its quick and deferential-to-arrest screening decisions. 287 
The implementation offelony-level procedures would also lead to 
improved scrutiny and testing of the government's case after 
charges have been initiated. For example, cases would be subject to 
review by a grand jury or a judge at a preliminary hearing. This 
review could at least weed out some of the weakest evidentiary 
cases, in part by discouraging prosecutors from pursuing such cases 
in the first place. Furthermore, imposing heightened discovery ob-
ligations on the government-in addition to the "free" discovery 
provided by preliminary hearings-would give the defense team a 
far better picture of the prosecutor's case than it typically receives 
in the normal misdemeanor setting. Among other things, this could 
help defense counsel learn where the government's pressure points 
are-or grease the wheels for a guilty plea upon better appreciating 
the strength of the government's case. Either way, having more 
information available, and available earlier, would strengthen the 
ability of the defense team to subject a case to meaningful adver-
sarial testing. 
The adoption of felony-level procedures for serious misdemean-
ors would also increase the degree to which prosecutorial charging 
decisions account for the views of the local community. "[T]he idea 
that prosecutors should be broadly responsive to the concerns of 
their community'' is one that "runs deep" in American criminal 
law.288 Indeed, this commitment to community oversight is reflected 
by the fact that 95 percent of all chief prosecutors in the United 
States are elected.289 But "direct elections are not likely to prove an 
effective means of giving prosecutors guidance as to a community's 
enforcement priorities or of holding them accountable for the dis-
286. For a persuasive discussion of the benefits of increased screening at the outset of 
cases, see generally Wright & Miller, supra note 95. 
287. See Bowers, supra note 87, at 1709; Natapoff, supra note 13, at 1328. 
288. Richman, supra note 166, at 960. 
289. See supra note 170. 
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cretionary decisions that they have already made."290 To the extent 
that prosecutorial elections are contested-which itself is infre-
quent291-they are typically focused on a few high-profile issues, and 
not the ''low-visibility enforcement decisions" of the sort at issue 
here.292 
More effective entry points for community influence on prosecu-
torial charging decisions are instead the petit jury and, where 
available, the grand jury. As Daniel Richman explains, a prosecutor 
concerned about conviction rates "must make all her decisions in the 
shadow of projected jury responses"-that is, at least, when the 
defendant has a right to demand a jury trial.293 In such circum-
stances, even "the mere possibility of a jury trial can bring an often 
overlooked degree of accountability into our system of essentially 
administrative justice."294 While this dynamic is "not necessarily the 
strongest of voices," the potential reaction of a group of laypersons 
drawn from the community surely ''has a far greater say in how 
prosecutors deploy their resources than ... any more direct mecha-
nism of political accountability."295 
The adoption offelony-level procedures for serious misdemeanors 
could have a related beneficial impact-even if a relatively small 
one-regarding the community's perception of the criminal justice 
290. Richman, supra note 166, at 963. 
291. See id. 
292. Id. at 963-65 ("Perhaps electoral or appointive politics will ensure that the com-
munity's preferences will at least be considered on some broad issues of the guns vs. butter 
variety .... But the bulk of the discretionary decisions that prosecutors make turn not on such 
broad matters of policy but on the individual circumstances of putative defendants, alleged 
victims, and other such case-specific factors.") (citation omitted). Richman echoes the ob-
servations made by earlier scholars. See generally KENNETH CULP DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY 
JUSTICE: A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY 3 (1969) (seeking "to minimize injustice from exercise of 
discretionary power"); ROSCOE POUND, CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN AMERICA 38 (1930) (suggesting 
that "[a] balance between rules of law and magisterial discretion ... is perhaps the most 
difficult problem of the science of law"); Donald G. Gifford, Meaningful Reform of Plea 
Bargaining: The Control of Prosecutorial Discretion, 1983 U. ILL. L. REV. 37, 41 (proposing "a 
model for regulating the exercise ofprosecutorial discretion in plea bargaining"). 
293. Richman, supra note 166, at 973. Recall that a key motivation for charging a 
borderline case as a misdemeanor is to avoid the possibility of a jury altogether. This is 
especially likely in jurisdictions where prosecutors perceive the potential jury pool to be 
comparatively hostile to the contemplated prosecution. See supra notes 184-87 and accom-
panying text. 
294. Richman, supra note 166, at 975. 
295. Id. at 973-74. 
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system. "Community participation in the administration of the 
criminal law," the Supreme Court has observed, "is not only con-
sistent with our democratic heritage but is also critical to public 
confidence in the fairness of the criminal justice system."296 While 
felony defendants receive a jurisdiction's highest forms of due 
process, misdemeanants typically receive something that could be 
charitably called due process ''light."297 Treating misdemeanor cases 
that carry grave penalties more like felonies and less like traffic 
infractions could make the process seem more legitimate and fair, 
thereby having positive effects on public confidence in the criminal 
justice system. 
Finally, applying felony procedures to serious misdemeanors may 
result in some prosecutors' and public defenders' offices routing 
those cases to more senior attorneys. Since these serious misde-
meanors would be treated as felonies from a procedural perspective, 
prosecutors' and defenders' offices could respond by shifting respon-
sibility for such cases to the attorneys that typically handle felony 
cases. This, in turn, could have several benefits. As noted, felony 
attorneys typically handle lighter caseloads, and therefore can de-
vote more attention to each individual case. In addition, those 
attorneys tend to be more experienced. The combination of smaller 
caseloads and more senior attorneys would increase the odds of 
achieving individualized and proportionate penalties in a particu-
lar case. 
I do not mean to suggest that the extension of felony procedures 
to misdemeanors triggering severe collateral consequences would 
be all roses. Because the efficiency gains associated with charging 
a misdemeanor would largely be eliminated, more borderline cases 
would likely be charged as felonies in my proposed world. Defen-
dants would thus be exposed to further and harsher penalties, 
296. Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 530 (1975). 
297. To be sure, providing a defendant with a jurisdiction's highest forms of due process 
is not a failsafe against nonmeritorious prosecutions or erroneous convictions. See generally 
BRANDON L. GARRETI, CONVICTING THE INNOCENT: WHERE CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS Go 
WRONG (2011). The point is simply that whatever one thinks of the process afforded felony 
defendants, misdemeanor defendants typically receive something much less. See Jenny 
Roberts, Crashing the Misdemeanor System, 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1089, 1093 (2013) 
("[T]here is little reason to have confidence in the outcome of convictions secured in our lower 
criminal courts."). 
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including the threat of increased incarceration and a slate of col-
lateral consequences that may not have been associated with the 
misdemeanor offense (such as disenfranchisement). The imposition 
of such additional penalties could have negative effects on the de-
fendant, his family, and society at large. 
Relatedly, because increased procedures mean increased costs, 
prosecutors might decide to forego some cases altogether. It is 
unlikely that prosecutors could transfer wholesale all cases that pre-
viously would have been charged as misdemeanors to the felony side 
of the ledger. Indeed, one of the main reasons prosecutors engage in 
strategic undercharging is because they are stretched too thin as it 
IS. 
Perhaps prosecutors would seek to mitigate the increased costs 
by lowering plea prices, in the hopes of inducing earlier and less 
costly guilty pleas. For example, prosecutors might view the mis-
demeanor-felony line as more permeable than they currently appear 
to do and offer misdemeanor pleas for cases initially charged as 
felonies. However, such an offer might be of limited effect if the 
collateral consequence is so severe that reduced prison exposure is 
of secondary importance to the defendant (such as a defendant 
facing deportation or a lengthy period of sex offender registration). 
In short, application of felony procedures to serious misdemeanors 
might result in prosecutors declining otherwise meritorious cases in 
light of the increased costs they would be forced to bear. 
CONCLUSION 
This Article explored the impact that collateral consequences 
have on prosecutors and, in particular, their initial charging deci-
sions. It explained why the attachment of severe collateral conse-
quences to misdemeanor offenses is likely to have a gravitational 
pull on prosecutors, incentivizing them to charge more borderline 
cases as misdemeanors rather than as felonies. This is because a 
misdemeanor triggering a severe collateral consequence offers 
prosecutors the ability to impose significant penalties at a fraction 
of the cost. Examining the effect collateral consequences have on 
prosecutorial decision making also revealed an important and previ-
ously overlooked charging tactic: strategic undercharging. Finally, 
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this Article explained why courts and legislatures should look 
beyond potential imprisonment when assessing relative offense 
severity and therefore determining the procedures afforded criminal 
defendants. 

